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Fig. 1. We propose RubikAuth, a novel authentication scheme for immersive virtual reality. Users wearing
a head-mounted display and holding a controller in each hand are presented with a 3D cube that they can
manipulate (i.e., rotate) to authenticate in VR. The figure shows how controller’s pose affects the cube.
To authenticate, users point at each desired digit and surface using either a) eye gaze, b) head pose, or
c) tapping with the right-hand controller, and confirm using the left controller’s trigger button. Through
three user studies, we assess RubikAuth’s usability, memorability, and observation resistance under three
realistic threat models. Findings of our usability study reveal the advantages of coordinated 3D manipulation
and pointing on a manipulable 3D object in VR. Our in-depth security study emphasises the importance of
considering advanced threat models to accurately assess a system’s security.
There is a growing need for usable and secure authentication in immersive virtual reality (VR). Established
concepts (e.g., 2D authentication schemes) are vulnerable to observation attacks, and most alternatives are
relatively slow. We present RubikAuth, an authentication scheme for VR where users authenticate quickly and
secure by selecting digits from a virtual 3D cube that leverages coordinated 3D manipulation and pointing. We
report on results from three studies comparing how pointing using eye gaze, head pose, and controller tapping
impact RubikAuth’s usability, memorability, and observation resistance under three realistic threat models.
We found that entering a four-symbol RubikAuth password is fast: 1.69 s to 3.5 s using controller tapping,
2.35 s to 4.68 s using head pose, and 2.39 s to 4.92 s using eye gaze and highly resilient to observations: 96%
to 99.55% of observation attacks were unsuccessful. RubikAuth also has a large theoretical password space:
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45n for an n-symbols password. Our work underlines the importance of considering novel but realistic threat
models beyond standard one-time attacks to fully assess the observation-resistance of authentication schemes.
We conclude with an in-depth discussion of authentication systems for virtual reality and outline five learned
lessons for designing and evaluating authentication schemes.
CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing → Human computer interaction (HCI); Virtual reality; •
Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Authentication, Usable Security, Virtual Reality, Threat Modeling, Observa-
tion, Head-mounted displays
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1 INTRODUCTION
The surge of immersive virtual reality applications [24, 37, 77] and the availability of high-end
untethered head-mounted displays (HMDs) [33, 111] are gradually making VR more ubiquitous.
However, the ability to experience VR almost anywhere comes with security implications. Users
are often required to authenticate in VR to, for example, make in-app purchases [62] or verify their
identity [61]. Recent research indicates that established authentication methods such as PINs or 2D
graphical passwords [42, 136] are prone to observation attacks when used in VR. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that VR users are often unaware of bystanders [34], especially whilst wearing
an HMD [40, 88]. On the other hand, requiring users to take their HMD off to authenticate negatively
impacts usability and immersion [55].
We present RubikAuth, a novel 3D authentication scheme for VR that is fast and resilient to
observation attacks, even against advanced threat models. RubikAuth’s users authenticate by selecting
colour-digit combinations from a 3D cube (Figure 1). The orientation of the cube is linked to the
user’s left handheld controller, allowing quick and covert manipulation of the cube. This allows
selecting digits from five of its six surfaces with high speed, accuracy, and ease. Each of the five
surfaces has nine selectable digits, which translate to 45n possible passwords of length n and is
higher than the majority of proposed authentication schemes for VR [41, 42, 74, 100, 136]. For
comparison, the password space of a four-symbol RubikAuth password is larger than four times
that of a six-digit numerical PIN. Observation attacks require simultaneous recovery of both the
cube’s pose and the user’s. Through three user studies and three advanced but realistic threat models,
we present an in-depth evaluation of RubikAuth and the impact of three methods for pointing at
target digits during authentication on the usability (N=23), memorability (N=21), and observation
resistance (N=15) of RubikAuth. The pointing methods are a) eye gaze, b) head pose, and c)
controller tapping. RubikAuth’s novelty lies in its reliance on an easily manipulable 3D object that is
environment-independent and manipulated through bimanual asymmetric interaction.
Through the studies, we show that RubikAuth makes authentication in VR a) fast: RubikAuth users
authenticate in 1.69 s to 4.92 s depending on the pointing method and complexity of the password,
which is faster compared to many previous authentication methods for VR [5, 41, 42, 49], b) secure
against observations by trained and expert attackers: 657 out of 672 (97.8%) attacks failed despite
optimal conditions, and even higher observation resistance (99.55%) when using gaze input and c)
easy to integrate into existing VR applications as it does not depend on the environment. RubikAuth
is also as accurate and its passwords are as memorable as previous work [41, 74]. Our memorability
study indicated a successful recall rate of 42.86% to 95.24% depending on the password strength
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(compared to 80.77% in [41]). Users authenticating on RubikAuth achieved entry accuracies between
85.80% and 97.83% (compared to 82% in [74]).
While we presented the concept and initial results in a CHI Late Breaking Work [85], this paper
extends the published work by an in-depth analysis of results from our usability study (Study 1:
Usability Evaluation), presenting results from an additional user study (Study 2: Memorability
Evaluation), and an in-depth analysis of RubikAuth’s observation resistance by introducing and
evaluating expert observation attacks that were part of the security study (Study 3: Security Evalu-
ation). Additionally, we contribute with an in-depth discussion of RubikAuth in the light of prior
work on authentication in VR, provide insights into the current trends of authentication for VR, and
present five lessons learned when designing and evaluating novel authentication schemes for VR.
The contributions of this work are fourfold and situated within authentication for virtual reality and
threat modeling, which is a key element when assessing a system’s security [89, 112, 116]:
a) Authentication for VR
(1) We present the first concept and implementation of authentication in VR using an environment-
independent manipulable 3D object and coordinated 3D manipulation and pointing derived
from bimanual asymmetric interaction.
(2) We provide an in-depth evaluation of the impact of pointing using eye gaze, head pose, and
controller tapping using a manipulable 3D object (RubikAuth) for authentication on usability,
memorability, and resistance to observations.
b) Realistic Threat Models and their Impact on Authentications
(3) We introduce three realistic threat models and two different types of attackers (i.e., trained
participants and an expert attacker) and study their impact on authentications on RubikAuth
when providing input with the different pointing methods presented in this work.
c) Lessons Learned: Design and Evaluation of Authentication Schemes for VR
(4) Finally, we perform an in-depth discussion of RubikAuth in the light of prior work and derive
a set of lessons learned to guide researchers and practitioners in the design and evaluation of
knowledge-based authentication schemes for VR.
2 RELATED WORK
In this work, we propose and evaluate a novel 3D authentication scheme for virtual reality. To
contextualise our work, we review authentication in mixed reality, that is, in virtual and augmented
reality. We categorise prior work into authentication schemes that rely on knowing a secret (i.e.,
knowledge-based authentication) and those that rely on biometrics.
2.1 Knowledge-based Authentication in VR/AR/MR
Knowledge-based authentication refers to authenticating using “something the user knows”. A
number of knowledge-based schemes were proposed. For example, Hadjidemetriou et al. [50]
proposed gesture-based authentication for mixed reality applications. They did not report entry time,
but password creation time was 16.69 s. In Khamis et al.’s work [74], authentication in VR using
smooth pursuit eye movements required 21.4 s for entering a 4-digit PIN using ten circulating 3D
cubes. Both works above focused on evaluating usability rather than security and/or observation
resistance.
Yu et al. [136] compared 3D patterns, 2D sliding patterns, and a 2D numeric keyboard for
authentication in VR. They reported that 3D passwords were the most secure against observations,
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and required 19 s to enter. Work that explored the “swipe” mobile device authentication system in
VR [100] achieved promising results in terms of usability, with fast authentications up to ≈1.0 s-1.8 s.
However, when attackers performed attacks on authentications with the help of video recordings,
“swipe” authentications manifest a high guessability success rate of ≈20% - 40%, depending on the
pattern. Similarly, George et al. [42] investigated how input techniques and interface sizes impact
authentication in VR using established authentication methods, such as PINs and 2D patterns. They
found that while authentication times can be as fast as 2.38 s, bystanders can observe up to 18% of
passwords. They concluded that there is a need for VR authentication schemes that utilise the 3D
environment and resist observation attacks.
A second category of work explored authentication by selecting 3D objects scattered in a virtual
room [39, 41] and a real room (mixed reality) [39]. This approach resulted in a notable improvement
in observation resistance. In George et al.’s RoomLock [41], real time observations were successful
12.5% of the time, but entry time was 8.58 s – 14.33 s. In LookUnlock [39], Funk et al. reported
that observations were successful 0% to 5.9% of the time. Their participants needed 1.5 s to select
each target, so we estimate entering a four-symbol password required ≈ 6 s. While these systems
improved security, their usability was not on par with their less secure counterparts (e.g., [42, 100]).
In comparison, our analysis shows users authenticate using RubikAuth in 1.69 s – 4.92 s depending
on the password strength and authentications are highly secure against observations: 96% to 99.55%
resistance. While room-based VR schemes such as RoomLock [41] and LookUnlock [39] require
loading an exclusive VR scene for authentication, RubikAuth is environment independent, and can
be easily integrated into any VR scene. We discuss RubikAuth’s usability and security along prior
work on knowledge-based authentication for VR further in Section 6 and Table 4.
2.2 Biometric Authentication in VR/AR/MR
In contrast to the aforementioned schemes, biometric authentication relies on the inherence factor,
i.e., something the user is. Li et al. [81] classified head movement-patterns to verify the identity of
wearable device users (e.g., HMD users). They achieved a mean true acceptance rate of 95.57% and a
mean false acceptance rate of 4.43%. More recently, Pfeuffer et al. [103] studied how different body
motions can be used for behavioural biometrics in VR. They found that hand movements and small
wrist rotations provide strong features to distinguish between multiple identities up to 63% accuracy.
This is inline with findings from Mathis et al. [86] that show that hand movement patterns during
knowledge-based authentication are promising for establishing an additional biometric security layer.
In their study they achieved an accuracy of up to 98.91% when leveraging hand movements and
rotations to identify users [86]. Work on seamless continuous biometric authentication by Ajit et
al. [3] and Miller et al. [90] achieved a maximum accuracy of 93.03% when using the orientation of
users’ right handheld controller and HMD headset.
Researchers also leveraged other aspects of human behaviour for authentication in mixed reality
applications. For example, Shen et al. [115] used gait recognition to authenticate users in virtual and
augmented reality applications. Having users perform five steps achieved a recognition accuracy of
up to 98%. Similarly, Mustafa et al. [95] leveraged head, hand, and body movements and Olade et
al. [99] employed kinesiological patterns for biometric authentication in VR. Both works showed
that human movement patterns are promising for user identification. Mustafa et al. [95] argued that
human behavioural biometrics are promising for an additional security layer to decrease the number
of successful observation attacks (equal error rate (EER) = 0.07) while Olade et al. [99] achieved an
average identification confidence value of 0.98. Work by Luo et al. achieved an even lower equal error
rate (3.55% and 4.97%) [83]. In their work they explore the entire human visual system (e.g., eyelid,
extraocular muscles) for biometric authentication in VR. Another behavioural biometric scheme for
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VR by Kupin et al. [78] matched the 3D trajectories of users as they perform a goal-oriented task,
achieving an accuracy of 92.86%.
Although the above-mentioned works achieved promising identification accuracies, work by Miller
et al. [91] showed that there is a noticeable drop in the accuracy when considering cross-system
behaviour-based biometric authentication. Their analysis across multiple VR systems (i.e., Oculus
Quest, HTC Vive, and HTC Vive Cosmos) achieved authentication accuracies between 58% and
85% [91]. It has also been argued that biometrics should only be used to enhance knowledge-based
schemes for VR rather than replace them [86, 95, 103], especially because behaviour might not be
unique for a large group size. For example, Sugrim et al. [124] showed that the accuracy of biometric
classifiers can drop over 35% when participants count increases from 20 to 250 and Olade et al. [99]
emphasised that physically similar attackers achieved higher confidence values when classifying
them in their study. This was already found when conducting a whitebox penetration test with a
sample size of 12 attackers [99].
2.2.1 Challenges of Biometric Authentication. While biometric authentication can be fast and
implicit, it often requires sharing personal data with third parties, which can be (and have been [123])
remotely stolen. It is challenging to change biometric passwords, and users can be forced into using
their physiological biometrics without consent (e.g., forcing a user’s finger against a sensor). As a
result, not all users are willing to use biometric authentication [105]. Moreover, VR applications
would require long-term or permanent (in the case of continuous authentication) access to sensor data
at a huge scale [110]. At the same time, biometric authentication raises ethical questions because
collecting and storing such sensitive data could potentially leak private information [2, 22, 110, 134].
The plethora of different VR devices that come with different user tracking techniques (e.g., inside-out
[111] vs. outside-in [104]) introduce further obstacles and challenge the generalisability and wide-
spread adoption of behavioural biometrics for authentication in VR even more [91]. Furthermore, it
is challenging to establish a minimally privacy-invasive behavioural biometric solution that protects
users to the same extent as knowledge-based authentication. As Herley and van Oorshot [56] put it:
“Repeated and sustained effort has failed to uncover a silver-bullet replacement for
passwords. It’s time to admit that this is unlikely to change. No single alternative
technology is likely to possess the combination of security, usability, and economic
features that meet all goals in all situations” [56].
This is not to say that biometric authentication is not promising. We note, however, that there are
many challenges that need to be addressed before it can deliver reliable and secure authentication. In
practice, most biometric schemes require a non-biometric fallback method; this is another avenue
where RubikAuth can support biometric authentication as we discuss in Section 6.5.2.
2.3 Contribution over Prior Work
From prior work on knowledge-based authentication we learn that transferring 2D authentication
schemes from the real world to VR often results in low observation resistance [42, 100, 136].
Research shows that leveraging the 3D element of virtual reality for authentication can improve
security [39, 41, 42]. However, we also learn that room-scale authentication is relatively slow [39, 41],
likely due to the need to search for items in virtual rooms. Prior work on biometric authentication
revealed several challenges such as the non-uniqueness of human behaviour biometrics for large
group sizes [99, 103, 124], data protection challenges and ethical issues [4, 110, 134], generalisability
challenges [91], and that not all users are willing to use biometric authentication [105].
The above-mentioned points motivated us to explore a novel knowledge-based authentication
scheme for VR: a manipulable 3D object that is independent of the environment. Allowing users to
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manipulate a 3D object using simple wrist movements makes selections faster and harder to observe
by bystanders. Another distinction of our work is that we compare three methods for pointing in this
context that are promising for VR/AR/MR applications [39, 79, 117, 118]: eye gaze, head pose, and
controller tapping. A further contribution of this work is that we consider three threat models that are
realistic and effective in the context of VR. Namely, we assess observation resistance when attackers
use: Pen and Paper to note down their observations, a 3D Replica of the manipulable object, and
Video Recordings of the user as they authenticate.
3 RUBIKAUTH: CONCEPT AND IMPLEMENTATION
RubikAuth is a knowledge-based authentication scheme, where users verify their identity by inputting
digits on a virtual 3×3×3 cube. The digits 1-9 are displayed on five of its six uniquely-coloured
surfaces; we omitted the rear face as it is not easily reachable. To authenticate using RubikAuth, the
user has to first 1) manipulate the object using wrist movements until they find an orientation from
which the target is reachable, then 2) point at the target digit on the target surface, and finally 3)
select the target by pressing the trigger button on the right-hand controller.
3.1 RubikAuth’s Visual Design
RubikAuth’s visual design is inspired by Rubik’s Cubea, a popular 3D combination puzzle. To
determine the size of the RubikAuth cube in VR, we ran pilot tests with four participants where
we experimented with different RubikAuth sizes keeping in mind that the radius of the HTC Vive
controller’s tip is ≈5cm. Based on the pilot tests, we decided to conduct all three user studies with a
cube that is ≈ 4×larger than the original Rubik’s Cube; our final implementation of RubikAuth has a
size “s” of 25cm × 25cm. This translates to a visual angle (α = 2 ×arctan(s/(2×d)) between ≈18◦
when users’ non-dominant arm is fully stretched (d= 78.42cm [23]), and ≈60◦ when users hold the
HTC VIVE controller (with a length of d≈22cmb) directly at their body. As previously mentioned,
experimenting with a larger cube compared to the original Rubik’s cube was necessary to enable
us exploring the impact of controller tapping on usability and security as the HTC VIVE controller
comes with a radius of its tip of ≈5cm.
We adopted the colour scheme from the original Rubik’s Cube: white, red, blue, yellow, green,
and orange (see Figure 1). However, RubikAuth supports different colours (including colour-blind
safe) and different cube sizes. We aligned all individual surfaces identically to 2D PIN-pads: starting
with the “1” at the top left side and the “9” at the bottom right side (see Figure 1).
We chose not to randomise the digit order and chose to fix the initial orientation, order of digits,
and order of colours because prior work on authentication showed that randomising authentication
interface elements reduces usability significantly [1, 25]. Furthermore, we wanted to test the limits
of RubikAuth assuming a best case scenario for the attacker; if RubikAuth’s security is already high
without randomisation (as we indeed show in Section 4.5.4), then any security improvement due to
randomisation will likely be relatively minor and out-weighted by the reduction in usability.
We discuss the benefits of a personalised RubikAuth orientation along with a personalised Ru-
bikAuth size further in Section 6.4.5.
3.2 Manipulating RubikAuth
The cube pose is directly linked to the sensed pose of an HTC VIVE controller held in the non-
dominant hand (we refer to this as the “left” hand throughout, but the mapping can be flipped).
aNote that the Rubik’s Cube reached its height of mainstream popularity in the 1980s, but it is still widely known and used
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubik%27s_Cube, last accessed 17/07/2020).
bThe length of an HTC VIVE controller (see https://www.vive.com/de/accessory/controller/, last accessed 17/07/2020) is
≈22cm.
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Fig. 2. We experimented with (1) eye gaze: looking at the target, depicted with a blue gaze trail; (2) head
pose: moving the target to the centre of the field of view, depicted with a pink dot; and (3) controller
tapping: moving the rendered right hand controller so that its tip intersects the target.
RubikAuth’s efficiency derives from the use of Guiard’s kinematic chain model for human asymmet-
rical bimanual cooperation [47, 48] and its resistance to observation by splitting input on multiple
modalities. Asymmetrical bimanual cooperation allows RubikAuth users to set the frame of reference
for the following interaction. This means that each hand in RubikAuth performs a different but
connected subtask: left hand pose to manipulate RubikAuth’s pose, an independent pointing control,
and right hand trigger press for target selection. Buxton et al. [14] and Kabbash et al. [63] highlighted
the naturalness and benefits of two-handed interaction: two-handed techniques can be designed such
that they take skills that are already in place into account [63]. In case of RubikAuth, splitting the
user’s input also splits the attacker’s attention, and thus complicates observation attacks [26, 131].
3.3 Pointing at Targets in RubikAuth
We implemented three pointing methods: 1) eye gaze: looking at the target; 2) head pose: moving the
target to the centre of the field of view; and 3) controller tapping: moving the rendered right hand
controller so that its tip intersects the target. The methods are illustrated in Figure 2. We explain the
three methods and the rationale behind choosing them below.
3.3.1 Eye Gaze. Gaze is a very promising modality for authentication in general (see [65] for a
review), and for authentication in VR in particular; immersive VR applications require wearing an
HMD which hides the user’s eye movements from bystanders and thereby concealing them from
bystanders. Eye trackers are integrated in many HMDs today, including the FOVE 0 [38] and the
HTC VIVE Pro Eye [59]. The plethora of applications of eye tracking in VR, such as foveated
rendering [102] and gaze-based input [74], together with the potential of 3D gaze on HMDs for
interaction design [58], suggest that eye trackers are becoming an integral part of HMDs. Thus, we
assume that HMD users will have already configured and calibrated the eye tracker by the time they
are attempting to authenticate. RubikAuth’s eye gaze mode uses gaze pointing, while selection is
done by pressing the trigger button of the right hand controller. The gaze point is visualised to the
user using a blue trail (Figure 2-1).
3.3.2 Head Pose. Before eye tracking became widely-available, head tracking was used for
hands-free pointing in VR, for example in Microsoft HoloLens [87], Oculus Rift [98], and Google
Cardboard [46]. There are on-going debates as to whether head pose is a sufficient proxy for eye
gaze in VR [6, 79]. Other works showed that head pose can outperform gaze in terms of error rate
and selection times [107, 135]. Head pose has been successfully used for VR authentication [39], but
head movements are more visible to bystanders than eye gaze. This motivated us to study how using
head pose in RubikAuth impacts the usability-security trade-off. In RubikAuth’s head pose mode,
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users select targets by bringing them to the centre of view (visualised by a pink dot, Figure 2-2) and
pressing the trigger button of the right hand controller.
3.3.3 Controller Tapping. Handheld controllers provide a natural way to interact with objects in
VR. This is the dominant selection technique in commercial VR systems [92, 98, 104, 111]. Previous
work on authentication in VR used handheld controllers [41, 42]. It was found that “tapping” close
targets is faster than pointing at distant targets [42]. We therefore elected to use tapping instead
of pointing using the controller in RubikAuth. In RubikAuth’s controller tapping mode, users tap
the target using the right-hand controller, and press the trigger button on the same controller. The
right-hand controller is rendered in real time to reflect its pose and position (Figure 2-3).
3.4 Selecting Targets in RubikAuth
All RubikAuth pointing methods use explicit selection by pressing the trigger button. Compared to
implicit selection methods like dwell time, the use of a trigger has several advantages: a) it gives
users more control [60], b) adds an additional channel that attackers must observe [71, 73], and c)
significantly decreases best-case authentication time; for example, reliable dwell selection requires at
least 350 ms per selection [94, 119], implying at least 1.4 seconds to enter a four-symbol password.
3.5 Password Space and Password Length in RubikAuth
RubikAuth passwords depend on both the digit and the chosen surface. For example, a RubikAuth
password could be: 5 (green), 3 (white), 4 (orange), 4 (blue). This means that there are (9 digits × 5
surfaces)4 = 4,100,625 theoretical possible passwords that consist of four symbols. For comparison,
there are 1,000,000 digit-only PINs of length six. We discuss the practical password space later in
the paper based on results of the usability and memorability studies (Study 1: Usability Evaluation
and Study 2: Memorability Evaluation). RubikAuth supports passwords of any length n. In our
evaluations we chose n = 4 for comparability to prior work [39, 41, 42, 136].
3.6 Switches
RubikAuth allows users to enter digits on five of its six surfaces. A surface switch occurs when the
user provides an entry on a surface that is different from the surface on which the previous entry
resided. Switches have an important role in authentication as they require the attacker to keep track
of the user’s manipulations, but might also increase entry time or decrease entry accuracy.
The idea of switching between input surfaces or input modalities was shown to improve observation
resistance [26, 71].
3.7 Implementation
RubikAuth was implemented in Unity, using C# as programming language. We used an HTC VIVE
HMD (2160 px×1200 px) with an integrated Tobii eye tracker (120 Hz update rate) [128] and the
SteamVR Plugin for Unity 3D [21] for the HTC VIVE controller communication. We used the Tobii
Pro VR SDK [128] for the eye gaze estimation and connected the HTC VIVE to a VR-ready laptop
(Razer Blade 15, NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080, Intel Core I7, 16GB RAM).
To facilitate comparisons of future work with ours, the source code is publicly available as recom-
mended by [125] and can be downloaded from https://github.com/FlorianMathis/RubikAuthSubmission.
3.7.1 Pointing Methods. For eye gaze, we visualised user’s gaze point using a blue trail (see
Figure 2-1). We used a prefab called [VRGazeTrail] provided by the Tobii Pro VR SDK [128] which
shows the position of the user’s gaze. Each particle of the gaze trail has a size of 0.5 cm and we used
a particle count of 45. We did not modify any other variables of the prefab provided by the Tobii Pro
VR SDK.
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For the head pose pointing technique, we used a 1:1 mapping of the user’s head position that
was directly linked to the HTC VIVE HMD that we tracked through the HTC VIVE Lighthouse
tracking system. We rendered a pink dot with a radius of 0.5 cm (see Figure 2-2) in the middle of
users’ field of view (FOV). To consider the interpupillary distance (IPD) and the corresponding two
lenses of the HTC VIVE, we rendered the dot at a distance (=depth in the virtual environment) of
35 cm (determined through pilot tests) of the user’s actual head. This enabled users to clearly point at
specific password elements of RubikAuth while rendering the dot as unobtrusive as possible to avoid
putting it in a dominant position in their FOV.
For controller tapping, we used the SteamVR Plugin [21] to represent the right hand-held
controller in VR (see Figure 2-3). Since it is possible that the HTC VIVE controller (virtually)
collides with multiple RubikAuth password elements at the same time, we calculate the distances
between the HTC VIVE controller and all collided elements to process user’s input after pressing the
trigger button. We then select the password element (e.g., “1” on RubikAuth’s green surface) that is
the nearest to controller’s tip. We used Vector3.sqrMagnitude from Unity where current holds all
password elements that collided with the HTC VIVE controller and transform.position represents the
position of the HTC VIVE controller in the virtual environment. See Listing 1 that we attached to the
GameObject (base class in Unity) of the HTC VIVE controller in users’ dominant hand:
Listing 1. C# example code that shows the implementation of the controller tapping pointing method.
1 private List<GameObject > current = new List<GameObject >();
2 float previousDistance = float.MaxValue;
3 float distance = 0.0f;
4 GameObject nearest = null;
5 foreach (GameObject gameobject in current)
6 {
7 distance = (other.position - transform.position).sqrMagnitude;
8 if (distance < previousDistance)
9 {
10 previousDistance = distance;
11 nearest = gameobject;
12 }
13 }
Note that the tracking accuracy of the HTC VIVE controller for the controller tapping condition
and the HTC VIVE headset for the head pose condition depends on the HTC VIVE Lighthouse
tracking system. The accuracy of the eye gaze point depends on the integrated Tobii eye tracker
and its corresponding 5-point HMD-based calibration that we used for all our studiesc. The Tobii
eye tracker used in our study has an estimated accuracy of 0.5°and a gaze data output frequency
(binocular) of 120 Hz according to the manufacturer [106]. The Lighthouse tracking of the HTC
VIVE HMD comes with a high precision of corresponding tracking measurements (tracker jitter
(RMS) < 0.02 cm and 0.02°) and a low system latency (22ms) [12, 97].
4 USER STUDIES
4.1 Evaluation Overview
We conducted three user studies to study RubikAuth’s a) usability, b) memorability, and c) observation
resistance under three realistic threat models that we explain below. We designed our memorability
cWe used in our usability and memorability study Tobii’s HMD based calibration that is based on a typical calibration pattern
for 5 points (see http://developer.tobiipro.com/commonconcepts/calibration.html, last accessed 17/07/2020)
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study as a follow-up study of the usability study with the same set of participants. For the security
study, we made an additional independent call for participants. All three studies were designed
as repeated measures experiments. Conditions were counter balanced using a Latin Square. All
experiments were approved by the relevant ethics board and written informed consent was obtained
from all subjects. All participants were compensated with an £8 online shop voucher.
In this work, we were particularly interested in following three research questions:
• RQ1: How do eye gaze, head pose, and controller tapping impact authentication in VR using
coordinated 3D manipulation and pointing?
• RQ2: How does the number of object manipulations (i.e., switches) influence authentications
in terms of usability and security?
• RQ3: How do human-centred threat models beyond classical one-time observations impact the
security evaluation of an authentication system as presented with RubikAuth?
With RQ1 we consider the impact of input method (i.e., eye gaze, head pose, and controller tapping)
on usability and security when authenticating. Gaze-based interaction should allow users to perform
more secure authentications as eye movements are less obtrusive compared to head and hand
movements, but may come at the cost of longer authentications. To this end, we measured input
performance (i.e., authentication time, entry accuracy) together with the resistance to observation
attacks when entering different passwords on RubikAuth.
RQ2 considers the impact of different RubikAuth password types on usability, memorability, and
security. In particular, we investigate the effect of object manipulations (e.g., no rotations (0-switch
password, baseline) vs. three rotations (3-switch password)) on usability and observation resistance.
With our third research question, RQ3, we explore the impact of three realistic threat models
on RubikAuth’s resistance to observations. Specifically, we conduct an in-depth evaluation of how
supporting attackers with equipment vs attackers with no equipment affects RubikAuth’s resistance
to observation attacks.
4.2 Statistical Analyses
In all our statistical analyses, we examined our data on normality prior to applying any statistical tests.
ANOVAs are considered to be fairly robust to deviations from normality and simulation studies, using
a variety of non-normal distributions, have shown that the false positive rate is not affected very much
by this violation of the assumption [45, 53, 82]. In cases where our data was not normally distributed
(e.g., slightly skewed to the right) but distributions were fairly similar skewed (see Figure 4) we
carried on with two-way repeated measures ANOVA.
For post hoc t-tests we applied Bonferroni corrections. Along our two-way repeated measures
ANOVA we report η2p (partial eta square), which is a standardised measure of effect size and the
most commonly reported estimated effect size for ANOVAs (0.01 = small, 0.06 = medium, 0.14
= large, [19]) [64, 80, 109]. In the case of non-parametric data (e.g., 5-point Likert scales), we
used Friedman tests with Wilcoxon signed-rank pairwise tests with Bonferroni correction. For our
qualitative data, we conducted open coding guided by the grounded theory [17, 44].
4.3 Study 1: Usability Evaluation
4.3.1 Independent Variables. Given the research questions, we experimented with two independent
variables. There were three levels for the Pointing Method and four levels for the Number of Switches:
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Fig. 3. In the usability study, participants were asked to enter predefined passwords. The digits and their
order were visualised using white digits on a black background (i.e., 1, 2, 3 and 4) as shown in (1) and (2).
Upon selection of four digits, the entire cube turned green if the authentication was successful as shown in
(3), or red if the input was incorrect.
• IV1) Pointing Method: We compared pointing in RubikAuth via eye gaze, head pose, and
controller tapping. We were particularly interested in the impact of each pointing method on
authentication time, entry accuracy, user preference, and observation resistance.
• IV2) Number of Switches: We studied the impact of the number of times the user switches
from one surface to another while authenticating. A four-symbol password in RubikAuth has
either 0-switches, 1-switch, 2-switches, or 3-switches (four conditions). Entering a 0-switches
password is equivalent to a classical 2D PIN-pad [42], so we treat 0-switches as our baseline in
this work. We discuss our choice of using RubikAuth’s 0-switch condition as baseline further
in Section 6.3.
4.3.2 Procedure. Participants were invited to our lab where the study was explained. After fill-
ing a consent form and a demographics questionnaire, participants were introduced to the virtual
environment, and how to use the HTC VIVE controllers. They went through a training session
where they tried RubikAuth and entered 3 passwords each with eye gaze, head pose and controller
tapping. We excluded all training runs from the analysis. Participants then went through one block per
pointing method, entering predefined passwords. In each block, participants entered 2 passwords×4
switches×4 repetitions = 32 passwords/block. Following each block, participants filled the NASA-
TLX [52] and a customised questionnaire with 5-point Likert scale questions. Before each password
entry, we showed participants which targets they should select directly on the cube. The order of the
digits was highlighted with white numbers on a black background (Figure 3). After completing the
three blocks, we conducted a semi-structured interview and asked participants to rank the pointing
methods based on their preference and perceived security. In preparation for the memorability study,
we concluded the usability study by asking the participants to use their most preferred pointing
method to define three passwords: a weak, a medium-strong, and a strong password. Participants
were asked to memorise these passwords for Study 2 and they then entered each of self-defined
passwords three times. Our usability study lasted for about 1 hour for each participant.
4.3.3 Dependent Variables. We evaluated the usability of RubikAuth using both quantitative and
qualitative measures. For the quantitative measures, we measured authentication time: the time from
the first input until the last input, entry accuracy: the number of correct entries, and the number
of digit errors. These measures were used to assess usability of authentication systems in previous
work (e.g., [26, 27, 41, 42]). For the qualitative measures, the emphasis was on understanding
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users’ experience and preferences when interacting with RubikAuth, and their perception of its
security against observation attacks. The following was collected for each pointing method:
• Perceived Mental Workload (NASA-TLX): We measured users’ workload, recording mental,
physical, and temporal demand, and effort, performance, and frustration. Participants self-
reported their perceived workload by filling in the NASA-TLX questionnaire [52].
• Perceived Usability (similar to [42]), intended to measure the perceived ease, rapidity, and
error proneness when entering RubikAuth passwords with different pointing methods.
– Ease of entering a PIN on RubikAuth: “It was easy to enter the PIN with the [method]
pointing method.”, 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
– Rapidity of entering a PIN on RubikAuth: “It was fast to enter the PIN with the [method]
pointing method.”, 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
– Error Proneness when entering a PIN on RubikAuth: “Entering the PIN with the [method]
pointing method was very error prone in my case.”, 5-point Likert scale from Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree.
• Perceived Observation Resistance: “It is difficult to guess a PIN that was entered with
[method] as input modality.”, 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
• User rankings (1 = best; 3 = worst, based on the rank sum weight calculation [120]); intended
to elicit user preferences of the pointing methods regarding usability and security.
– Usability: “Please rank the input techniques based on your perception of usability.”.
– Security: “Please rank the input techniques based on your perception of security (i.e., when
someone observes you from the real world during authentication).”.
• User Preference: “Consider the situation where you can use one of the previously experienced
pointing methods for authentication on RubikAuth in VR in the future. In terms of both,
usability and security, which pointing method would you prefer to use?”; intended to elicit
their preference in a daily use without focusing on security or usability separately.
At completion of the study, semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect qualitative feedback.
4.3.4 Usability Evaluation Results. We recruited 23 participants (13 females, 10 males) aged
between 18 and 54 years (M=27.65, SD=8.26). Out of 23 participants, 11 (47.83%) self-reported that
they had never used VR before. We logged 8 passwords× 3 pointing methods× 4 repetitions× 23
participants = 2208 authentications. We excluded 87 outliers due to tracking issues, such as moving
out of the tracking range, or accidentally pressing the menu button on the HTC VIVE controller.
We measured a) authentication and preparation time, b) entry accuracy and error rate, c) perceived
workload, and d) perceived usability and security.
Authentication Time. We measured authentication time from the moment the first entry is made
until the fourth symbol is selected. This allows us to compare authentication times with previous
authentication schemes in VR (e.g., [39, 41, 42, 50, 74, 136]).
We verified our interpretation of the histograms in Figure 4 by running a Shapiro-Wilk’s test of
normality. Authentication times were not normally distributed. However, ANOVAs are considered
to be fairly robust to deviations from normality [45, 53, 82], especially in the case of a marginal
skewness; therefore we continued with our analysis. When analysing input time of these successful
authentications, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction, due
to violation of the sphericity assumption, revealed a statistically significant main effect of pointing
method (F1.619,35.617 = 38.894, p < .05, η2p = 0.639) and number of switches on authentication
time (F2.477,54.497 = 309.887, p < .05, η2p = 0.934). It also showed a significant two-way interaction
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Fig. 4. Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality (p < 0.05) and the histogram of the authentication times revealed
that authentication times were not normally distributed and manifest a positive skewness (slightly skewed
to the right). Left, the authentication times for eye gaze, in the middle for head pose, and on the right for
controller tapping.
0-switch passwords 1-switch passwords 2-switch passwords 3-switch passwords
Eye Gaze 2.39 2.85 3.58 4.92
Head Pose 2.35 2.93 3.72 4.68















































Eye Gaze 85.80% 88.95% 89.89% 88.30% 88.23%
Head Pose 97.83% 93.99% 84.57% 92.26% 92.16%

























Fig. 5. Controller tapping results in significantly faster authentications compared to gaze and head pose.
Surface switches increases authentication time significantly. p < .001 denoted by ***. Mean entry accuracy
when using head pose (92.16%) is slightly higher compared to controller tapping (91.87%) and eye gaze
(88.23%). No significant differences were found (p > .05). Error bars show the standard deviation.
between pointing method and number of switches on authentication time (F3.619,79.621 = 5.096, p <
.05, η2p = 0.188).
Further analysis was conducted to distinguish the impact of each independent variable. Individual
ANOVAs for each switches condition and post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction showed that
across all switches, authentication time using controller tapping (M=2.60s, SD=0.90s) is significantly
faster (p < .05) than when using eye gaze (M=3.60s, SD=1.35s) or head pose (M=3.44s, SD=1.07s).
We found no significant differences between eye gaze and head pose (p > .05). Results are sum-
marised in Figure 5.
Finding 1: Users authenticate using a four-symbol password on RubikAuth in 1.69 s to 4.92 s.
Controller tapping is the fastest pointing method for RubikAuth, but there is no evidence that eye
gaze or head pose result in significantly different input times.
Authentications on RubikAuth are faster than most values reported for existing VR authentication
schemes [41, 42, 50, 74, 136]. We also found that authentication time is significantly different across
switches (p < .05, Figure 5).
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Table 1. When providing input on RubikAuth with eye gaze, participants made more entry errors compared
to head pose (+4.1%) and controller tapping (+3.7%).
Finding 2: Input times are significantly faster when users switch cube faces less frequently.
We also measured the preparation time, which is the time it takes a user to make the first entry
on RubikAuth. We measured preparation time as done by von Zezschwitz et al. [131], which is
on average 1.33 s (SD=0.62 s): 1.40s (SD=0.58s) for eye gaze, 1.30 s (SD=0.56 s) for head pose,
and 1.29 s (SD=0.71 s) for controller tapping. As a result, RubikAuth’s preparation time is in line
with [131] (1.2 s to 1.3 s). In the work by Olade et al. [100] the preparation time was reported as
“pre-login delay time” with ≈ 350 ms to 820 ms (according to Figure 5 in [100]), depending on the
input modality. No other comparisons to authentication schemes in VR can be made as these values
were not reported in previous work – we summarise all publicly available values for comparison in
Table 4 as part of our discussion.
Entry Accuracy. The average successful entry rate, the percentage of correct entries during au-
thentication, is 90.80% across all conditions. This is in line with prior work on authentication in VR
[42, 74] and also reinforces our decision to experiment with a 25cm×25cm cube. The work by Olade
et al. [100] only reports that they noticed “very high” error rates. The rates for RubikAuth are 88.2%
(SD=32.2%) for eye gaze, 92.3% (SD=26.8%) for head pose, and 91.9% (SD=27.3%) for controller
tapping. Figure 5 shows the entry accuracy for all conditions. We did not find statistically significant
differences in accuracy between the pointing methods (p > .05).
Finding 3: Entry accuracy when using RubikAuth is 90.80% on average. There is no evidence
that pointing methods, or number of switches impact accuracy.
Entry Errors. Entry errors is the number of digit errors made during authentication when providing
input with one of the pointing methods. A Friedman test was run to determine if there were differences
in the number of errors between the input modalities. Post hoc pairwise comparisons were performed
using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The number of errors was statistically significantly different
depending on the input modality, χ2 = 7.432, p = .024. Post hoc analysis revealed statistical significant
differences in the number of errors between eye gaze and controller tapping (Z = -2.245, p < .05),
between eye gaze and head pose (Z = -2.148, p < .05), but not between head pose and controller
tapping (Z = -0.637, p = 0.524).
Qualitative feedback from our participants revealed that their pointing task when using eye gaze
was often one step ahead of the selection task (i.e., pressing the trigger button to confirm the selection).
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Thus, by selecting four digits which are in close proximity, e.g., when selecting 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 on
the same surface, participants had already moved their gaze to the following digit, e.g., confirmed the
selection of digit 2 instead of digit 1. This resulted in more PIN entry errors in eye gaze compared to
controller tapping and head pose. Table 1 shows the number of entry errors for each pointing method.
Perceived Workload. The perceived workload was measured using NASA-TLX [52] out of 100.
No evidence for significant effects of pointing methods on perceived workload was found. Perceived
workload of using controller tapping (M=31.85, SD=4.94) is slightly lower than that for eye gaze
(M=36.45, SD=4.61) and head pose (M=36.41, SD=5.26). Comparisons of perceived workload when
using RubikAuth to previous authentication schemes for VR is unfortunately not possible as we
could not find any reported values. The only exception is the work by George et al. [41] that assessed
perceived workload when authenticating in VR, but did not report the values.
Finding 4: There is no evidence that one pointing method is more demanding than the others.
Single dimensions of the perceived mental workload by using NASA-TLX [52] are depicted in
Figure 10 together with attackers’ perceived workload that we measured in the security study. We
report on both as this allows us to assess the perceived workload when using RubikAuth in relation
to observing authentications on RubikAuth.
Impact of Prior Experience in VR. We also compared the performance of participants who used VR
before with those who did not. VR experienced users authenticated in (M=3.27s, SD=0.623s), made
9.56% errors, and had a perceived workload score of 34.17. For non-VR experienced participants,
the values were (M=3.15s, SD=0.567s), 10.25%, and 36.41. None of the differences were significant
(p > .05). This highlights the naturalness of interacting with RubikAuth gained from the use of
Guiard’s kinematic chain model [47, 48].
Finding 5: There is no evidence that prior experience with VR has an impact on authentications
in RubikAuth. We found no significant differences between non-VR and VR experienced users in
terms of authentication time, error rate, and perceived workload.
As previously mentioned, ≈52% of our participants used VR at least once, which is comparable
to prior work where 48% [42], 60% [100], and 67% [41] of participants had experience using VR. In
contrast, Hadjidemetriou et al. [50] stated their participants had no or limited experience with VR.
Perceived Usability and Security. Participants reported whether they perceived the pointing meth-
ods to be easy, error-prone, and fast on 5-point Likert scales (1=strongly disagree;5=strongly agree).
No significant effects of pointing method were found on the ease of use and error-proneness (p >
.05); on average, participants found all pointing methods easy (Med=4). Standard deviations are
1.03, 0.98 and 0.56 for gaze, head pose, and tapping respectively. Gaze is perceived more error-prone
(Med=3, SD=0.95) than head pose (Med=2, SD=1.03) and controller tapping (Med=2, SD=0.90).
Participants perceived controller tapping to be significantly faster (Z = -2.424, p < .05) than head
pose, as confirmed by a Friedman test (χ2(2) = 6.778, p < .05) and Wilcoxon signed-rank pairwise
tests with Bonferroni correction. The other pairs were not significantly different (p > .05).
The median speed rating is 4.0 for all methods, while standard deviations are 0.99, 1.08 and 0.63
for gaze, head pose, and tapping respectively.
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User Rankings. We asked participants to rank the methods based on their usability and security
(1=best;3=worst). Raw scores were multiplied by their weight factor: ×3 for rank 1, ×2 for rank 2,
and ×1 for rank 3, and then summed up to compute weighted scores (based on [120]). The weighted
scores of eye gaze, head pose and controller tapping are 44, 39, and 55 respectively for usability, and
67, 46, 25 for security. This means gaze is perceived the most secure, and tapping the most usable.
User Preference. We asked our participants which pointing method they prefer in terms of both
usability and security when authenticating using RubikAuth. 14 (60.87%) participants voiced that
they prefer to enter their passwords using eye gaze, 5 (21.74%) using head pose, and 4 (17.39%)
using controller tapping. Additionally, we asked them to define three different passwords using the
preferred modality mentioned before: a weak, medium-strong, and strong password. This was done
in preparation for the memorability study where they had to recall their self-defined passwords.
Finding 6: Users prefer gaze in terms of security, and controller tapping in terms of usability. In
terms of both usability and security, most participants prefer gaze.
Fig. 6. Two participants in the usability study inter-
acting with RubikAuth. We received positive feedback
from our participants in terms of usability and user
experience when interacting with RubikAuth.
General Qualitative Feedback. Participants
enjoyed using RubikAuth (Figure 6). P15 re-
marked “I like the idea immensely. I think it
could be a really secure [and] fun method to
enter a password.”. Participants also saw the
benefits RubikAuth offers. For example, they
appreciated the improved password space and
highlighted the added security by making “more
options available to set passwords” P13 and
“[offering] a bigger set of possible characters”
P9. Participants also indicated that they found
the system usable.
P9, for example, highlighted that learning ef-
fects will result in faster authentications: “[cube
rotation and digit selection] is a skill that can
be improved over time”. P3, who also participated in the following memorability study, added that it
is “easy to remember movements”. P23 even suggested that it would be promising to use RubikAuth
at a real automated teller machine (ATM).
4.4 Study 2: Memorability Evaluation
We re-invited participants to a memorability study exactly a week later; 21 of the 23 participants in our
usability study attended. We asked them to re-enter the three passwords they had set and were asked
to remember (Section 4.3.2), using the same pointing method they used when setting the password
in the usability study. This was followed by a semi-structured interview to get further information
about users’ perception and memorising approaches of passwords with different strengths. The
memorability study lasted for about 20 minutes for each participant.
4.4.1 Memorability Evaluation Results. We collected 3 passwords × 23 participants = 69 pass-
words from the usability study participants, and invited them to this follow-up study to assess
memorability. The following recall success rates are based on 21 participants. Two did not return
for the memorability study (drop-out rate 8.7%). 20 participants (95.24%) recalled their weak, 13
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Switches
Password Strength 0 1 2 3
weak 22 (95.65%) 0 0 1 (4.35%)
medium-strong 12 (52.17%) 6 (26.09%) 2 (8.70%) 3 (13.04%)
strong 4 (17.40%) 2 (8.70%) 7 (30.43%) 10 (43.48%)
Table 2. When asked to choose weak, medium-strong and strong passwords, users chose digits from
several surfaces, especially for strong passwords. This suggests the practical password space utilises the
majority of the theoretical space.
(61.90%) their medium-strong, and 9 (42.86%) their strong password. This is despite two participants
saying they did not realise they had to memorise their passwords despite being asked to.
Finding 7: Users recall RubikAuth passwords, but with lower accuracy when there are many
switches involved in the authentication process.
When asking participants about the reasons for not being able to recall their medium-strong and
strong PINs, they outlined that it was challenging for them to recall the correct colours due to the
fact that the format of the PIN (i.e., combination of digit and surface) was new to them. P4 explicitly
mentioned that they experienced VR the very first time and that the authentication scheme was novel
to them and that the combination of both might have affected their recall performance. Interestingly,
another participant, P8, mentioned that they did not use the PIN within the last week; thus they
could not establish some kind of muscle memory. They also mentioned that more repetitions and an
increased usage within the last week would consolidate the specific motor task to rotate the cube into
their memory through repetition.
Analysis of Users’ Chosen Passwords. 22 of the 23 weak passwords had 0-switches, i.e., included
one surface only (Med=1, SD=0.63). For medium-strong passwords, 11 participants used 1-, 2-, or
3-switch passwords, while 12 used 0-switch passwords (Med=1, SD=1.07). For strong passwords,
17 participants used 2- or 3-switches (Med=3, SD=1.13). Users’ chosen password characteristics
are summarised in Table 2. From participants’ feedback and our own observations, participants
perceived two main factors contributing to strong passwords: a) More variation in the selected
password: the defined strong passwords involved non-adjacent targets that also span over multiple
surfaces, and b) Inconspicuous password entry: some participants held the cube in an orientation
that allows selecting from multiple surfaces, especially when providing input with eye gaze. Some
even suggested faking cube rotations to trick attackers.
Finding 8: Users perceive passwords with more switches to be more secure against observations.
Users’ Approach to Memorise RubikAuth passwords. To understand users’ approach when trying to
memorise passwords generated on RubikAuth, we asked our participants to tell us their memorability
approaches. The majority of our participants (N=22) considered only one surface for their weak
RubikAuth password. They mentioned things like “it is weak, no specific measures were taken”
(P5), “put all on one face in a line” (P8), “a simple sequence” (P18), “even numbers” (P16), and
“consecutive numbers” (P12). While two participants (P15, P21) mentioned that their RubikAuth
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password was related to personal details (e.g., birth date), two other participants (P1, P23) outlined
that they tried to memorise it by re-visualising the cube’s rotations in their head multiple times.
Regarding the semi-strong password, P9, P10, and P18 mentioned that they used numbers which
were familiar to them or sequential. P8 voiced that their approach to memorise the strong RubikAuth
password was focusing on the manipulations. They explicitly mentioned that they tried to memorise
the cube rotations.
Surprisingly. 13 participants (56.5%) transferred the weakest 4-digit PIN (“1234”, [7]) without
any modifications (i.e., all four digits on the same surface) to RubikAuth. Feedback from participants
revealed that they treated the cube as an ordinary numeric keyboard during the creation process of
the weak RubikAuth password. This reinforces our decision to treat 0-switches as a baseline for its
similarity to traditional 2D PIN pads. On the other hand, when defining a stronger PIN, participants
leveraged RubikAuth’s characteristics and rotations to define stronger passwords and memorise them.
To get further insights into participants’ memorability of different PIN strengths, we conducted an
open-coding guided by the grounded theory [17, 44] on participants’ responses when asking them
about their approach to memorise their different RubikAuth passwords. The lead author performed
an initial open coding. After the open coding, we had nine codes for the memorability of weak
passwords, and six codes regarding medium-strong and strong RubikAuth passwords. We then
conducted an affinity diagram [70] of the open codes and organised the codes into groups. We outline
the most frequent voiced strategies below, together with the number of times the comment was made:
• Memorability: Weak RubikAuth Password
– Spatial Proximity (N=9): Participants selected their password based on the spatial proximity
(i.e., digits on the same surface and next to each other, in a line on one single surface).
– Effortless Memorability (N=9): Participants voiced that they memorised their weak pass-
word with minimal effort and that they did not have to take specific measures (i.e., it was
easy to remember “1234” on the same surface without rotating the cube). A weak password
is considered to be easy to guess and also easy to memorise.
– The Attacker’s Perspective (N=4): Participants selected their weak password knowing that
weak passwords are those that are easy to guess (e.g., “1234”) by attackers.
• Memorability: Medium-Strong RubikAuth Password
– Password Cues (N=9): Participants transferred their existing PINs to RubikAuth. They also
used cube rotations/surface colours as password cue and tried to create a story with the help
of the rotations and surface colours; for example, a participant entered their partner’s year of
birth on the red surface as they associate the colour with their relationship.
– Visual Patterns (N=5): Participants selected passwords in a sequence that resembles a
pattern (e.g., a cross).
• Memorability: Strong RubikAuth Password
– Mental Visualisation (N=9): The password was memorised by mentally visualising the
password (i.e., sequence of the digits, spatial positioning of the digits) multiple times or by
recalling the movements and rotations of the cube.
– Physical Movement and Rotation (N=4): Participants held the cube in a specific pose and
used specific rotations (e.g., the sequence of rotations) as a cue for memorising the password.
The overall storyline of the qualitative description of strategies to memorise passwords can be read as
a way to improve the memorability of the selected passwords. In particular, participants memorability
approaches indicate that they tried to leverage the third dimension in VR to improve memorability of
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their passwords, i.e., spatial proximity of digits on different surfaces, and used physical movements,
i.e., cube rotations, to make their passwords more memorable.
4.5 Study 3: Security Evaluation
4.5.1 Independent Variables. We studied the impact of the same variables that we used in the
usability study on security: IV1) Pointing Method and IV2) Number of Switches. We added IV3)
Threat Model and studied the impact of different realistic threat models on the observation resistance
of RubikAuth. Our threat models are described below in detail.
Threat Models. To understand RubikAuth’s observation resistance in worst case scenarios, we
evaluated the resistance to observations under three threat models that ensure optimal yet realistic
conditions for the attacker. In all threat models, the attacker a) has an optimal view of the user’s
interactions, b) can move freely, c) knows the beginning and the end of the authentication process,
d) knows which pointing method will be used, and e) knows that the user will enter a four-symbol
password. The attacker’s knowledge of this information is realistic as previous work showed that
bystanders are able to identify the user’s task in VR [40]. Similar to untethered HMD systems
[38, 111], we assume that the user’s view is not cast on any nearby display.
• Threat Model 1: Pen and Paper The attacker observes the user during authentication. They
note down observations on a pen and paper on which an abstract 2D form of RubikAuth is
drawn with labels showing the surface colours (Figure 7-1).
• Threat Model 2: 3D Replica In recent work, attackers came up with ways to help them note
down observations (e.g., folding paper to form a 3D version of a virtual environment [41]).
Motivated by these strategies, in addition to the material used in threat model 1, the attacker
uses a real-world replica of the 3D cube: a Rubik’s cube with overlaid digits (Figure 7-2).
• Threat Model 3: Video Recordings Motivated by the ubiquity of smartphones, here the
attacker uses a smartphone (Samsung Galaxy S7 EDGE, Dual Pixel Camera 12MP) to record
and freely playback authentications, in addition to all material used in threat model 1 and 2
(Figure 7-3). The attacker has the advantage of choosing the recording angle as the user is not
aware of their presence due to the HMD obscuring their view [40, 88].
4.5.2 Procedures. Similar to the procedure in the usability study, participants were invited to our
lab where we studied the observation resistance of RubikAuth. After filling a consent form and a
demographics questionnaire, participants were introduced to the virtual environment, and how to
run observation attacks. In a training session, we a) introduced them to the arrangement of the digits
and surface colours of RubikAuth, b) allowed them to enter multiple passwords using all pointing
methods, and c) allowed them to run training attacks on all pointing methods. The study was split
into two stages. In stage 1, the participant took the role of the attacker and observed the experimenter.
In stage 2, they switched roles: the experimenter was the attacker and observed the participant.
In stage 1, passwords were entered by the experimenter, while we simulated the three threat models
with the participant as the attacker. Each participant performed 36 attacks against: 1 password×4
switches×3 pointing methods×3 threat models. Attacks were performed on 36 predefined unique
passwords to ensure fairness of comparisons. Participants were told which pointing method will be
used and the beginning and end of the authentication process.
In stage 2, the participant and the experimenter switched roles. Studying the attacking performance
of the experimenter against the participants’ has several advantages. The experimenter implemented
RubikAuth; his expertise resulting from implementing the system, using it for several months,
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Fig. 7. In the first threat model (1), attackers observe the experimenter during authentication and use a
pen and paper to note down observations. (2) In the second threat model, the attacker has a real-world
3D replica of RubikAuth to assist in visualising the user’s input. (3) In threat model 3, attackers use a
smartphone to record the experimenter during authentication and can freely playback the recordings.
overseeing the security study and training other participants gives him an advantage as an attacker.
The participant self-defined and entered three passwords of different strengths: weak, medium-strong
and strong using each pointing method. The experimenter was not aware of the passwords beforehand.
He performed: 3 password strengths×3 pointing methods×15 participants = 135 attacks. We could
not perform three attacks on one participant when using eye gaze due to inaccurate eye tracking
when wearing glasses.
The security study concluded with a semi-structured interview and lasted for about 1 hour for each
participant. To motivate participants to perform well, they took part in a lottery for an additional £8
online shop voucher where the chance of winning increases as they correctly guess more passwords.
4.5.3 Dependent Variables. We evaluated the observation resistance of RubikAuth using both
quantitative and qualitative measures. For the quantitative measures, we examined the successful
attack rate: the number of successful attacks, and the attack accuracy: the distance between the
guess of the attacker and the correct PIN. These values were measured for each attack. As for the
qualitative measures, we aimed to understand how participants perform their attacks. To this end, we
analysed their attack behaviour by re-watching their observation attacks that we recorded, conducted
semi-structured interviews, and collected further data through questionnaires:
• Perceived Observation Resistance: “It is difficult to guess a password that is entered with
the [method] pointing method.”, 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Participants answered this question before and after performing the attacks (similar to [42]).
We were interested if there is a change in participants’ perceived observation resistance of the
pointing methods.
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• Perceived Mental Workload (NASA-TLX): We measured attackers’ workload using the
NASA-TLX questionnaire [52] after switching from attacks on one pointing method to the
next. This allowed us to assess the mental workload associated with attacking passwords
entered using eye gaze, head pose, and controller tapping.
• Confidence during Observation Attacks: “I am confident that I observed the PIN correctly.”,
5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. This data was collected after
each observation attack to measure their confidence in their observation.
• Perceived Observation Ease: “It was easy to observe PINs when they were entered with
[method] as pointing method.”, 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
This data was collected after running all observation attacks.
At completion of the security study, we asked participants to let us know about their observation
approach when running the attacks on eye gaze, head pose, and controller tapping: “Please briefly
describe how you tried to observe the PIN entries when a) eye gaze was used to enter the PIN, b)
when head-pose was used to enter the PIN, and c) when tapping was used to enter the PIN.”.
4.5.4 Security Evaluation Results. We invited 15 participants (5 females, 10 males) aged between
17 and 44 years (M = 26.6, SD = 6.79) to the security study. The call for participants was independent
of the usability and memorability study. We analysed 672 observation attacks: 540 by trained
participants, and 132 by the expert experimenter. We measured a) perceived observation resistance b)
successful attack rate, c) attack accuracy, d) perceived attacker confidence, e) perceived workload of
attackers, and f) perceived observation ease.
Perceived Observation Resistance. Friedman tests were run to determine whether or not there are
differences in the perceived observation resistance of the pointing methods.
• Before Observation Attacks Perceived security was statistically significantly different be-
tween the pointing methods, χ2(2) = 9.692, p < .05. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests revealed a significant difference in the perception of the security between eye gaze
and controller tapping (Z = -2.632, p < .05) and head pose and controller tapping (Z = -2.495,
p < .05), but not between eye gaze and head pose (p > .05). The median for controller tapping
was 3, and 4 for eye gaze and head pose on a 5-point Likert scale where 5 means highly secure
and 1 highly insecure.
• After Observation Attacks Perceived security was statistically significantly different between
the pointing methods, χ2(2) = 18.053, p < 0.01. Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests revealed a significant difference in the perception of the security between eye gaze and
controller tapping (Z = -3.025, p < .05), and head pose and eye gaze (Z = -2.495, p < .05), but
not between controller tapping and head pose (p > .05). (Z = -1.342, p = .180). The median
for eye gaze changed from 4 to 5 and for controller tapping from 3 to 4. There was no change
in the median of head pose (Md = 4).
The increase in perceived observation resistance of eye gaze (4 to 5) and controller tapping (3 to
4) indicates that participants underestimated the observation resistance of the two methods.
Finding 9: Participants perceive eye gaze as the most secure pointing method, followed by head
pose. After performing observation attacks on their own, participants perceived eye gaze and
controller tapping as more secure than previously.
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Fig. 8. The patterns depict the successfully attacked 0-switch RubikAuth passwords. The figure shows that
attackers were more successful when passwords were entered on single surfaces and followed specific
patterns. For example, the most left pattern shows the selected RubikAuth password “1G3G7G9G” where
the numbers (1,3,7,9) were selected on the green surface (G) and depict a “Z”. This password was
successfully guessed two times (2x). All successfully attacked passwords were entered with head pose or
controller tapping.
Eye Gaze Head pose Tapping
Switches 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Total
Threat 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3
Threat 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Threat 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
All Threats 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 4 0 0 0
Total 0 4 4 8
Table 3. Attacks against RubikAuth are rarely successful. Attacks were only successful against head pose
and controller tapping. Not a single attack on eye gaze was successful.
Successful Attack Rate. We measured the successful attack rate, i.e., the percentage of times the
correct password was guessed. Participant attacks were successful 8 out of 540 times: 0 successes
against eye gaze, 4 against head pose, and 4 against controller tapping. All successful attacks were
either against 0-switch (7) or 2-switch passwords (1). Interestingly, the majority of the successfully
attacked passwords were entered on a single surface and followed relatively simple patterns, see
Figure 8. The overall results are summarised in Table 3. In the experimenter’s attacks, 7 out of 132
were successful: 1 in eye gaze and head pose, and 5 in controller tapping.
Finding 10: RubikAuth resists 98.52% of observations by trained participants, and 94.7% of those
by an expert attacker. No attacks on 3-switch passwords were successful.
Attack Accuracy. To gain better insights on how close the guesses are to the entered passwords, we
calculated the Euclidean distance between the centre of each of the four entered password symbols,
and the centre of the corresponding symbols of the password guessed by the attacker. While previous
work used Levenshtein distance to measure similarity of guesses [28, 42, 76], we opted for Euclidean
distance because it better reflects spatial distances between targets on different surfaces of the 3x3x3
cube. An attack is considered more successful if the Euclidean distance is shorter. To study the effect
of the independent variables on the Euclidean distance between the input and the attack, we ran a
three-way repeated measures ANOVA. No significant three-way interaction was found (p > .05). We
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SD's
Pen and Paper
0.0720987 0.08322393 0.07299924 0.05402057 0.0951817 0.05426683 0.04514667 0.06675328 0.09895903 0.06920501 0.06744875 0.05364907
Gaze Head Tapping
0-switch 0.0720987 0.0951817 0.09895903
1-switch 0.08322393 0.05426683 0.06920501
2-switch 0.07299924 0.04514667 0.06744875
3-switch 0.05402057 0.06675328 0.05364907
3D replica
0.06360992 0.07157281 0.07222188 0.05852255 0.09102869 0.10330967 0.05976249 0.06594948 0.09191784 0.06236096 0.08122397 0.04883532
Gaze Head Tapping
0-switch 0.06360992 0.09102869 0.09191784
1-switch 0.07157281 0.10330967 0.06236096
2-switch 0.07222188 0.05976249 0.08122397
3-switch 0.05852255 0.06594948 0.04883532
3D replica and Video Recording
0.05635601 0.07675647 0.07337575 0.06270212 0.10486817 0.09305673 0.08943278 0.07761443 0.08227326 0.08617811 0.08940296 0.05771963
Gaze Head Tapping
0-switch 0.05635601 0.10486817 0.08227326
1-switch 0.07675647 0.09305673 0.08617811
2-switch 0.07337575 0.08943278 0.08940296
3-switch 0.06270212 0.07761443 0.05771963
Eye Gaze Head Pose Tapping
0-switches 0.261 0.231 0.147
1-switch 0.247 0.275 0.238
2-switches 0.253 0.275 0.248




























Pen and Paper 
Eye Gaze Head Pose Tapping
0-switches 0.259 0.233 0.233
1-switch 0.242 0.241 0.237
2-switches 0.252 0.265 0.216





























Eye Gaze Head Pose Tapping
0-switches 0.252 0.194 0.153
1-switch 0.245 0.213 0.2
2-switches 0.254 0.219 0.213

































Fig. 9. The mean Euclidean distances between the attackers’ guesses and the actual passwords show
that a) increasing switches significantly improves security, and b) eye gaze is significantly more secure
compared to head pose and controller tapping even against advanced threat models. Significance of p <
.05 is denoted by *. Error bars show the standard deviation.
ran subsequent two-way ANOVA tests where two-way interaction effects were found, and followed
those by pair-wise comparisons using t-tests with Bonferroni corrected p-values.
In case of threat model 1, where attackers used pen and paper to note their observations, attacks
against controller tapping are significantly (p < .05) more successful when passwords contain
0-switches (M=0.147, SD=0.102), compared to 2-switches (M=0.248, SD=0.070) and 3-switches
(M=0.259, SD=0.056), where 0 is a perfect match to the correct password and 0.37 is an unsuccessful
attack. We also found that RubikAuth passwords that contain 0-switches are significantly more
secure (p < .05) when entered using eye gaze (M=0.261, SD=0.075) compared to controller tapping
(M=0.147, SD=0.102). Results are summarised in Figure 9.
Finding 11: Increasing surface switches when authenticating using RubikAuth significantly
improves observation resistance when using controller tapping. Using gaze pointing while entering
0-switch passwords is still highly secure, but relatively error-prone (Figure 5).
In threat model 3, where attackers use video recordings, entering passwords using eye gaze
(M=0.251, SD=0.057) is significantly more secure (p < .05) than head pose (M=0.218, SD=0.079)
and controller tapping (M=0.204, SD=0.046).
Finding 12: Using gaze for pointing in RubikAuth makes passwords more secure against basic
and advanced observation attacks that utilise real-world 3D replicas and video recordings.
To understand if certain threat models result in more successful attacks, we compared the accuracy
of guesses by running multiple ANOVAs. We found a significant main effect of threat model on
Euclidean distance when using head pose (F2,28 = 4.349, p < .05, η2p = 0.237) and controller tapping
(F2,28 = 5.426, p < .05, η2p = 0.279). Post hoc analysis using t-tests with Bonferroni correction
confirmed the significant differences between threat model 3 (M=0.218, SD=0.079) and threat model
1 (M=0.257, SD=0.044) when using head pose, and between threat model 3 (M=0.204, SD=0.045)
and threat model 2 (M=0.239, SD=0.059) when using controller tapping.
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SD's MD MD Attacker PD PD Attacker TD TD Attacker Performance Performance AttackerEffort Effort AttackerFrustration Frustration Attacker
Gaze 22.21011537 23.62672686 20.36992483 27.10883415 17.61540398 19.87181141 16.70945987 19.2930615 25.08397993 22.49938271 22.73792498 27.80087928
Head 23.99590387 26.19584361 18.04740659 28.21740991 20.79470268 25.86288632 18.67541878 15.68438714 21.00049509 21.89875694 20.1881509 28.56960312
Tapping 20.57077781 17.43559577 22.82919234 28.69378562 20.14831584 23.51358945 17.74637533 14.19702629 19.77663551 20.77391527 17.12844835 26.89485701

























Eye gaze 40.43 80.33 32.39 31.33 33.04 81.33 36.52 86.67 43.48 80.67 32.83 70.67
Head pose 37.39 72.33 42.17 35.67 34.57 71.67 31.52 78.00 42.61 77.67 30.22 67.67



















* * * * * 
Fig. 10. Perceived workload of RubikAuth users is significantly lower than the perceived workload of
attackers. The high NASA-TLX scores in the security study indicate that observation attacks on RubikAuth
are demanding. Significance of p < .05 is denoted by *. Error bars show the standard deviation.
Finding 13: Video recordings and real-world replicas of RubikAuth significantly improve attack
accuracy, although not enough to significantly increase the number of successful attacks.
As for the experimenter’s attacks, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant
effect of password strength on attack accuracy (F2, 24 = 12.562, p < .05, η2p = 0.511). We neither
found a significant effect of pointing method nor an interaction effect (p > .05).
Post hoc analysis using t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed significant differences (p <
.05) between all pairs: weak RubikAuth passwords (M=0.130, SD=0.095) are more vulnerable to
observation attacks than medium-strong passwords (M=0.169, SD=0.089). Both are more vulnerable
than strong passwords (M=0.255, SD=0.095).
Finding 14: Users’ perceptions of what makes RubikAuth passwords secure matches reality.
Confidence during Observation Attacks. Participants reported on their subjective confidence of
conducting successful observation attacks on a 5-point Likert scale. Participants’ confidence was
lowest in threat model 2 when using the 3D replica (M=2.05,Med=2,SD=1.1). It was slightly higher
in threat model 1 when using pen and paper (M=2.10,Med=2,SD=1.04), and was at its highest in
threat model 3 when using video recordings (M=2.24,Med=2,SD=1.03). This shows a tendency that
participants were more confident in threat model 3. However their confidence (Md = 2) was still
relatively low.
Similar to participants’ observation attacks, we measured the perceived confidence of the expert’s
observation attacks. The subjective confidence of successful observation attacks was in general low.
The expert rated the statement “I am confident that my observation attack was successful.” with an
average of 2.33 (SD = 1.27, Md = 2).
Finding 15: Both the trained participants and the expert attacker were not confident about their
guesses during observation attacks.
Perceived Workload of Observations. The perceived workload of attacks was measured using
NASA-TLX [52] out of 100. Overall score for eye gaze is higher (M=71.83, SD=20.50) than for
head pose (M=67.17, SD=15.92) and controller tapping (M=64.22, SD=15.42). But we found no
significant differences (p > .05). All NASA-TLX raw scores are significantly higher for attackers
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compared to RubikAuth users, as confirmed by multiple independent t-tests (p < .05), except for the
raw scores of physical demand. This indicates that observation attacks on RubikAuth are significantly
more demanding than using RubikAuth (Finding 4 and Figure 10).
Finding 16: Attacks on RubikAuth are demanding. There is no evidence that attacks on one
pointing method are more demanding than the others.
Perceived Observation Ease. When asking participants at the end of the study how easy it was
for them to run successful observation attacks on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 =
Strongly Agree), all participants perceived gaze to be the most difficult to attack (Med=1, SD=0).
Head pose (Med=2, SD=0.65) (Z = -3.217, p < .05) and controller tapping (Med=2, SD=0.88) (Z =
-3.126, p < .05) are perceived easier to attack, as confirmed by a Friedman test (χ2(2) = 22.400, p <
.05) and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with Bonferroni correction. There is no difference of perceived
observation ease of pointing method between head pose and controller tapping (p > .05). This is in
line with our findings when asking our participants before and after the observation attacks about the
perceived observation resistance of each pointing method.
Finding 17: Gaze is perceived to be the most difficult to attack. There is no evidence that the
perceived difficulty is significantly different for head pose and controller tapping.
Attackers’ Strategies. We analysed participants’ attack behaviour by reviewing video recordings
of the study sessions.
• In threat model 1 where participants used only a pen and a paper, participants focused mostly
on guessing surfaces instead of digits as the latter was perceived as too challenging. Participants
tried to visualise the cube rotations to repeat the gestures themselves (Figure 11-1).
• In threat model 2 participants tapped on the physical 3D replica of the cube to simulate
the authentication and gazed at the cube to visualise the authentication. Interestingly, one
participant did not interact with the 3D replica. We assume that they did not see an advantage
of explicit interactions with the replica. To summarise, when using the real-world replica of
the 3D cube most participants tried to replicate the rotations performed by the user during their
authentication (Figure 11-2).
• In threat model 3 where attackers had access to the 3D replica and to the recorded authentica-
tions on the smartphone, they repeated the entire physical movements during their attack and
tapped on the 3D cube in parallel to watching the video recordings multiple times (Figure 11-3).
Independent of the threat model, during attacks on eye gaze attackers focused primarily on the
rotation of the non-dominant hand and tried to spot slight head movements. The one successful
observation attack by the experimenter on eye gaze relied on slight head movements. More attention
is paid to head movements when passwords are entered with head pose, and to dominant hand
movements when passwords are entered with controller tapping to derive the spatial relation of
RubikAuth’s password elements.
5 GENERALISABILITY, VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS
Like many empirical studies, it is important to note that the below-mentioned technological and
experimental design limitations should be considered when interpreting our findings.
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Fig. 11. In threat model 1, participants imitated cube rotations and pointing actions (1). In threat models 2
and 3, participants made use of the 3D replica (2) and video recordings (3).
5.1 Experimental Design Limitations
As opposed to real authentications where a user authenticates less frequently than in our usability
study, excessive gaze-based inputs could have resulted in longer entry times due to eye fatigue [75],
or faster entry times due to learning effects. Moreover, multiple consecutive authentications likely
have an influence on the reported feedback and perceived workload for all three pointing methods.
Since participants provided input an equal number of times using each pointing method, we expect
that relative results across the conditions will remain the same. Providing users with unfamiliar
PINs could also have had an effect on some of our measures (e.g., authentication time). Similar to
prior work (e.g., [41, 42]), we had a training phase where users entered predefined passwords on
RubikAuth. Further, we used relatively short passwords (i.e., 4-digit PINs). Prior work found that
short passwords do not appear to follow a significant habituation trend [126].
A limitation in our memorability study is the lack of rewards for correctly recalling the password,
and that participants did not use the created password for a week before the memorability study. In
real scenarios, the user is incentivised to remember their passwords to, for example, maintain access
to data or be able to perform purchases, and will likely use their password frequently after setting it
[54, 84, 122]. This suggests our memorability results might be on the lower edge of performance in
the real world which is likely to be better.
Regarding the security study, our participants put in a lot of effort in terms of time and attention,
as they performed overall 36 observation attacks. The entire security study lasted one hour per
participant. Arguably, the number of observation attacks performed by an attacker varies in a real-
world setting and conducting multiple observation attacks within a short time period as in our security
study may lead to fatigue. To prevent significant fatigue, we had several short breaks between each
observation attack, and longer breaks before switching to a different threat model. Another limitation
worth to mention is that the attackers were aware of a) the length of the password, and b) the start
and end of the authentication. In the real world, users may create longer RubikAuth passwords and
attackers will not be aware of that.
5.2 Generalisability of RubikAuth’s Concept
Although we studied only one manipulable 3D object in VR (in our case RubikAuth, a 3D cube),
we showed through three user studies that leveraging the concept of coordinated 3D manipulation
and pointing through bimanual asymmetric interaction [14, 63] results in fast and highly secure
authentications. We note that using shapes that are easily understandable (e.g., a 3D cube) has a
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positive impact on security. Users are generally familiar with the 3D cube structure from their real
world experiences, which in turn contributes to their awareness of what makes passwords strong
as presented in our work (see Section 6.4.3). For example, our results suggest that in the case of
0-switch passwords (defined as weak passwords by our participants, see Table 2) users transferred
more or less well-known weak passwords from existing authentication schemes to RubikAuth. In the
case of strong passwords (mostly 2-switch and 3-switch passwords, see also Table 2), the defined
passwords by our participants manifested indeed a higher resistance to observations.
It should also be noted that the benefits of asymmetrical bimanual cooperation combined with
a manipulable 3D object as presented with RubikAuth for authentication in VR may not be fully
transferable to all types of 3D objects (e.g., more complex 3D objects).
5.3 Threats to Validity
While our study designs and evaluation approaches are common in research on HCI, Usable Security
and Privacy, and VR, some of our specific decisions have limitations to keep in mind.
5.3.1 Internal and External Validity. We contributed with several factors to avoid confounding
variables and ensure high internal validity. Our usability and memorability studies were conducted
in the same highly controlled lab setting for all study sessions. The security study was conducted
in a different room, but with all sessions in the same room. For all studies, we counter-balanced all
conditions and participants were not aware of the RubikAuth password categories (e.g., 2-switch)
they have to input in the usability study or guess in the security study. We also used a study protocol
in all three studies. This minimised the potential of introducing additional variables in some sessions
but not in others. All these factors contributed to high internal validity.
Although our evaluation of RubikAuth is based on three user studies: a usability (≈ 23 hours),
memorability (≈ 4 hours 20 minutes), and security study (≈ 15 hours), all evaluations of RubikAuth
were in the lab. Conducting the security evaluation in a controlled setting as done in our work
depicts a best-case-scenario for attackers and highlights RubikAuth’s resistance to observation
attacks. Therefore, attackers in a real-world setting would yield similar attack rates or perform even
worse due to additional noise such as bystanders who may cover parts of a victims interaction when
authenticating, or their lack of awareness of the length of the password. In terms of our lab-based
usability and memorability study, participants were standing still and did not move during the
authentication task. VR users are generally fully immersed and unaware of physical surroundings
[40, 88]; thus, it is rather unlikely that there are significant movements (e.g., walking) during
authentication in VR, especially when considering the safety of the user (and their bystanders).
When talking about the ecological validity, it is likely that users’ provided passwords in the
memorability study do not match their real-world passwords. This is mainly because of the lower
ecological validity of password studies [35] and due to the fact that existing authentication systems
in the real world do not provide users with multiple surfaces to select their password from (e.g., an
ATM represents only a 2D PIN-pad).
Furthermore, given the resources available, we had sample sizes of N=23, N=21, and N=15 for our
three studies. Although these sample sizes are common in HCI research [15], statistical tests indicat-
ing significant differences do so only for our sample and may not have a significant high external
validity regarding the generalisability to the wider population that manifests varying demographics
such as age, gender, cultural background, VR experience. However, our early comparison between
VR-experienced and non VR-experienced users in Section 4.3.4 suggests that there is no significant
difference between those two groups when interacting with RubikAuth.
5.3.2 Conclusion Validity. Regarding conclusion validity (also known as statistical validity), we
performed our analyses with statistical tests that are well-recognised, commonly used in HCI research,
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and also used by prior work on authentication in VR (e.g., [39, 41, 42, 100]). Our sample sizes (N=23,
N=21, N=15) are in line with prior works that studied authentication in VR (e.g., [41, 42, 100] and
noticeably larger than user studies within the HCI community as pointed out by [15]. Furthermore,
our analysis was performed on overall 2208 authentications in the usability study and 672 attacks in
the security study. We reported the partial eta squared values (η2p) as a measure for the estimated
effect size [64, 80, 109]. According to [19] our analyses manifest large effect sizes (all >0.14).
Although our sample sizes are typical in HCI research and in line with previous work, it is
important to keep the sample size discussion in Section 5.3.1 in mind.
Additionally to presenting a novel authentication scheme for VR and introducing three realistic
threat models for assessing the system’s resistance to observations, our work also outlines learned
lessons for designing and evaluating novel authentication schemes as presented with RubikAuth, to
guide further research when studying authentication in VR and human-centred threat models.
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
First, when comparing RubikAuth’s entry time and observation resistance to prior work, we achieved
fast entry times (Finding 1) and high observation resistance (Finding 10) for authentication in VR.
RubikAuth’s recall and input accuracy are high (Findings 3 and 7) and consistent with previous work
[42, 74]. A comparison of RubikAuth’s memorability is limited as we only found one prior work on
authentication in VR ([42]) that reports on memorability evaluation results. Although the work by
Olade et al. [100] reports memorability in terms of pre-login delay time [121], we cannot compare it
to our work due to the use of different metrics. Table 4 outlines all comparisons to prior work on
knowledge-based authentication in VR.
6.1 Implications for Research Questions
In the following we discuss our research questions in the light of our findings from our usability,
memorability, and security user studies.
6.1.1 Usability, Memorability and Security of RubikAuth.
RQ1: How do eye gaze, head pose, and controller tapping impact authentication in VR using
coordinated 3D manipulation and pointing?
The quantitative results of the usability study show that using controller tapping in RubikAuth results
in the fastest authentications and high entry accuracy. This is confirmed by participants’ perception;
they perceived controller tapping to be significantly faster than eye gaze and head pose. The perceived
ease of providing input with eye gaze, head pose, and controller tapping in RubikAuth suggests that
participants found all pointing methods easy to use.
In contrast, while gaze-based input resulted in significantly longer authentications and more entry
errors, our security analysis under three realistic threat models suggested that eye gaze is significantly
more secure than controller tapping and head pose. This is in line with the qualitative feedback.
The subjective user ranking together with the analysis of the perceived security clearly indicate that
gaze-based pointing in combination with coordinated 3D manipulation is perceived as most secure.
To conclude, eye gaze manifests the highest observation resistance when using coordinated 3D
manipulation and pointing for authentication in VR, but at the expense of longer authentication times.
Controller tapping leads to significantly faster authentications than eye gaze and head pose, and is
still highly secure against observation attacks, but not as secure as eye gaze. Both the quantitative
and qualitative analyses suggest that head pose is a valid alternative to gaze-based interaction in
RubikAuth that achieves fast authentications, but at the expense of lower observation resistance. Head
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Authentication System Entry time ObservationResistance Memorability
RubikAuth strong password: 42.86%
medium-strong password: 61.90%
weak password: 95.24%
eye gaze 2.39 s - 4.92 s 99.55% -
head pose 2.35 s - 4.68 s 97.78% -
controller tapping 1.69 s - 3.5 s 96% -
VRPursuits [74] 21.40 s Not reported Not reported
RoomLock [41] 8.58 s - 14.33 s 87.5% - 100% 80.77%
HoloPass [50] 16.69s Not reported Not reported
LookUnlock [39] ≈6 s̃ 94.1% - 100% Not reported
2D PINs & 2D Patterns [42] 2.38 s - 3.84 s 82% Not reported
VR Swipe [100] ≈1.0 s - 1.8 s* ≈60% - 80%* Not reported
2D sliding patterns [136] ≈10.5 s Not reported Not reported
2D numeric keyboard [136] ≈10.5 s Not reported Not reported
3D patterns [136] 19 s Not reported Not reported
Table 4. RubikAuth improves entry time and observation resistance over many existing schemes for VR/AR
systems. All systems above use four-symbol passwords, expect [100] who used 6 SWIPE Passwords.
We did not report perceived mental workload of the prior works as none of them reported these values.
There is one work [41] that assessed users’ perceived workload, but they did not report the values. (̃)
The implementation of LookUnlock [39] indicates that entering a four-symbol password takes at least 6 s
(4×1.5 s). (*) We report the average authentication times according to [100, Fig. 4] and the observation
resistance under ‘ ‘attacker scenario B” since this is the most comparable scenario to our security analysis.
pose does not stand out in any evaluations; however, we see head pose as a promising alternative to
eye gaze, but with the downside of lower observation resistance.
RQ2: How does the number of object manipulations influence authentication in terms of
usability and security?
To reflect on RQ2, we want to distinguish between three factors that are noticeably affected by
the number of object manipulations during authentication. These factors are authentication time,
memorability, and observation resistance.
Our usability study shows that the number of object manipulations increases authentication time.
This is not surprising as more object manipulations include more physical movements (i.e., hand
rotations). However, our qualitative findings also suggest that additional object manipulations are
promising for tricking bystanders that are observing the authentication. For example, one could rotate
the cube multiple times back and forth while selecting all password elements from the same surface.
Related to this, qualitative feedback during the memorability study suggests that these object
manipulations could support users’ recall process. In particular, participants mentioned that the
cube pose and corresponding arm rotations acted as cues for memorising their RubikAuth password.
However, to the contrary, our quantitative analysis also indicates that passwords that manifest more
object manipulations are harder to memorise. Nevertheless, we believe that our recall success rates
are the result of a lab study where participants used an authentication scheme like RubikAuth for
their first time and did not use RubikAuth passwords within the week before the memorability study.
Regarding observation resistance, our quantitative analysis of the security study revealed that
object manipulations result in more secure authentication, independent of the pointing method. Along
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this, our participants manifest a basic understanding of what makes a password secure when using
RubikAuth– more RubikAuth rotations are not only perceived as more secure, they are objectively
more secure as indicated by the security study.
6.1.2 The Impact of Advanced Threat Models on Security Evaluations.
RQ3: How do human-centred threat models beyond classical one-time observations impact the
security evaluation of an authentication system as presented with RubikAuth?
Our quantitative results from our security study suggest that supporting attackers with additional
equipment supports their attacks. Although the rate of successful attacks still remained low due
to RubikAuth’s high resistance to observation attacks, our in-depth analysis of the attack accuracy
revealed that there are indeed significant differences between our studied threat models. For example,
we found significant differences of the attack accuracy between threat model 3 (video recordings)
and threat model 1 (pen and paper) when using head pose, and threat model 3 (video recordings) and
threat model 2 (3D replica) when using controller tapping. This suggests that human-centred threat
models beyond classical one-time observations impact a system’s security evaluation.
Moreover, attackers were more confident when they had access to physical props (e.g., 3D replica
of RubikAuth and smartphone) during their observation attacks. Qualitative feedback and our video
recordings of attackers’ observation strategy also revealed that our participants made use of the
additional physical props (threat model 2 and 3) that we provided.
To conclude, human-centred threat models beyond classical one-time observations as simu-
lated with our three threat models improve attacks and result in advanced security evaluations.
Such advanced threat models as presented in our work together with threat models that involve
multiple attackers at the same time as presented in [72] are vital to evaluate a system’s security.
In light of RubikAuth’s security results and our lessons learned through the security study we
highly encourage researchers and practitioners conducting research on authentication to consider
advanced threat models as presented in this work to increase the validity of security evaluations and
consider contexts where attackers may have access to additional support material.
6.2 Using Manipulable 3D Objects for Authentication
While previous work used 3D objects in the environment [39, 41] and static 2D and 3D selectable
targets for authentication in AR and VR [42, 74, 136], in this work we use a 3D cube that is
independent from the environment, is directly linked to controller motion, and has nine targets on
five of its six sides. The advantage of this design is manifold: 1) it gives quick access to many
targets in high speed using minimal wrist movements and low workload, 2) the coordinated 3D
manipulation and pointing likely taps into muscle memory particularly when using controller tapping,
3) it complicates attacks by requiring attackers need to observe both the cube manipulations and the
positions of the selected targets, 4) it significantly increases the theoretical password space, and 5)
the intuitiveness of cube manipulations makes it easier for users to anticipate actions that improve
observation resistance.
Our quantitative analysis indicates that authentications in VR on RubikAuth are not affected by
users’ prior experience with VR (Finding 5).
The usability study shows that RubikAuth is fast. It is also as fast or faster than many observation
resilient authentication schemes for mobile devices and public displays, RubikAuth is faster than
schemes like SwiPIN (3.7 s) [131] and CueAuth (3.73 s-26.35 s) [76], and faster than gaze-based PIN
entry on computer screens (5.3 s-6.28 s, [1]; 8.14 s-12.68 s, [36]). Note that similar to RubikAuth, the
entry times above were reported for four-symbol passwords. RubikAuth’s fast authentications also
confirm Katsini et al.’s [68] findings when evaluating a three-dimensional graphical authentication
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scheme on a desktop computer. Their results show that users who used the three-dimensional
graphical authentication scheme created their passwords in less time compared to those who used the
two-dimensional one.
Continued use of RubikAuth is likely to result in faster authentications due to learning effects;
muscle memory [114] might aid participants in recalling and performing manipulations. The high
authentication speed can also be attributed to the fact that muscle memory [114] aids users in entering
RubikAuth passwords faster. It is also likely that muscle memory helps improve the memorability
of the passwords over time. This is not the case when using controller tapping only, as rotating
the cube is possible even when using head pose or eye gaze for pointing in RubikAuth. Some of
our participants mentioned during the memorability study that they tried to establish some kind of
muscle memory based on the cube rotations in their non-dominant hand despite the fact that they
only entered their RubikAuth passwords three times to memorise them. One participant voiced that
they did not have “enough time [to establish] muscle memory.” (P8). Additional entries over a long
time would allow them to support their recall process at a later time by consolidating the specific
motor task, which is necessary to interact with different surfaces, into their memory.
The security study showed that RubikAuth is resilient to observations by expert and trained
attackers (Finding 10), even in advanced threat models (Finding 13). This is attributed to the high
cognitive effort required to observe the manipulations and multiple visual channels, such as head
movements and hand movements, at the same time (Finding 16 and Figure 10). This is in line with
prior work [26, 71, 76, 131] that overwhelm the attacker by requiring them to keep track of a lot of
information. Additional aspects of the human body such as foot-tapping for selection in RubikAuth
could overwhelm attackers even more in the future [93]. Increasing the number of surface switches
improves security significantly (Finding 11).
For high observation resistance when using controller tapping, we recommend to include at least
one switch in RubikAuth passwords. Gaze performs well against all studied threat models even
without switches (Findings 11 and 12), but at the expense of longer authentication time, and relatively
lower accuracy in case of 0-switches. A longitudinal study of fast gaze-based input showed that input
time decreases after several hours of training [129]. Due to the fact that our participants provided
gaze-based input on RubikAuth only for a few minutes during the usability study, we assume that
long-term gaze-based interaction on RubikAuth would depict a similar decrease in authentication
time. Similarly to gaze-based interaction, increasing the number of switches increases authentication
time (Finding 2). In total, authentications on RubikAuth are fast (1.69 s to 4.92 s) and highly secure
(97.78% - 100%); therefore we recommend to leverage similar manipulable 3D objects for frequent
authentications in VR.
6.3 RubikAuth’s baseline: the 0-switch condition
Additionally to the discussion of RubikAuth’s usability and security in Section 6.1.1, here, we
compare RubikAuth to previous works on authentication for VR/AR (see Table 4) and discuss
RubikAuth’s performance with respect to the baseline condition (0-switch RubikAuth passwords).
Treating the 0-switch condition as our baseline was motivated by the fact that there are no cube
rotations required when using 0-switch passwords for authentication, and that the surface facing the
user resembles a traditional PIN-pad as already explored by, for example, George et al. [42] and Olade
et al. [100]. In fact, our 0-switch condition is functionally equivalent to a 2D PIN/Pattern-pad that is
positionally tracked. Our findings from three user studies show that introducing 3D manipulations
(e.g., physical cube rotations to enter 3-switch PINs) enhance user authentications in many ways (see
Section 4.3.4, 4.4.1, and 4.5.4). Moreover, previous work highlighted overwhelming attackers leads
to more secure systems [26, 71, 76, 131]. We hypothesised that 1-switch, 2-switch, and 3-switch
passwords lead to more secure authentications, similarly to the work by Khamis et al. [71, 73].
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Note that while in the work by Khamis et al. [71, 73] a switch is defined as a change in the used
input modality during authentication, in RubikAuth we refer to surface switches as described in
Section 3.6, similarly to the work by De Luca et al. [26].
In the following we discuss RubikAuth’s usability and security along the 0-switch condition.
6.3.1 Usability. Our usability study revealed that 0-switch authentications are significantly faster
than 1-switch, 2-switch, or 3-switch RubikAuth authentications. We also learned that cube rotations
do not necessarily reduce the entry accuracy and can be used to trick attackers, even when inputting
a 0-switch RubikAuth password through “fake rotations”.
Furthermore, our memorability study revealed that more than half of our participants transferred
the password “1234” to RubikAuth, which is considered to be the weakest PIN on a 2D PIN-pad [7].
We also learned from qualitative feedback that participants treated the cube as a 2D PIN-pad in the
case of a 0-switch password. Interesting is users’ perception of “weak RubikAuth passwords”. As
highlighted in Table 2, 22 participants (95.65%) defined a 0-switch password as a weak password.
This is interesting since most authentication schemes (e.g., [42, 100, 136]) rely on 2D PIN-pads and
are similar to RubikAuth and a 0-switch password. Regarding memorability, our qualitative feedback
revealed that weak passwords (defined as 0-switch RubikAuth passwords by our participants) were
more memorable. Mainly because participants could transfer their existing mental model of passwords
from other authentication schemes (e.g., ATMs, 2D PIN-pads) to RubikAuth.
While the same does not hold true for 1-switch, 2-switch, and 3-switch passwords, RubikAuth’s
characteristics (e.g., cube rotations) could augment users’ mental model in the long run through, for
example, establishing muscle memory.
6.3.2 Security. RubikAuth comes with a larger theoretical password space compared to previous
authentication schemes for VR and AR [39, 41, 74], especially compared to 2D-PIN pads [42, 100,
136]. When considering 0-switch passwords only, RubikAuth comes with a theoretical password
space that is equal to authentication schemes studied in prior works (e.g., [41, 100, 136].
In light of RubikAuth’s other conditions (e.g., 3-switch passwords), the theoretical password space
is much larger. Still, there is no additional value in a large theoretical password space if users only
rely on a small subset of the theoretically possible password space (practical password space [113]).
The practical password space is often much smaller because of the scheme-dependent predictability
of user choices [11].
We indeed showed in our work that providing users with a fully manipulable 3D object as done
with RubikAuth nudges users to create more diverse passwords. For example, when asking users to
create a strong RubikAuth password, they utilised the majority of the theoretical password space,
rather than just considering one surface of RubikAuth (see Table 2). While this shows that the
additional password space of RubikAuth is used by users, it is not clear at this stage if authentications
that take use of the larger theoretical password space are more secure against attacks. Yet, our security
study revealed that increasing the number of switches significantly improves security (see Figure
9). Furthermore, as for the experimenter’s attacks, strong passwords (3-switch passwords) were
significantly more secure than weak passwords (0-switch passwords, baseline).
To conclude, we explicitly neglected to use a simple 2D surface with digits as our baseline because
entering a 0-switch PIN on RubikAuth does not involve any cube rotations, and thus it is similar to
entering a PIN on a 2D surface, and because there is already work that conducted in-depth studies on
2D authentication schemes for VR [42, 100] that we used for comparison in Table 4. Further, our
three user studies, particularly also qualitative feedback from our participants during the usability
and memorability study (see Section 4.3.4 and 4.4.1), and our human-centred approach to generate
different password strengths on RubikAuth, show that our baseline, RubikAuth’s 0-switch condition,
was indeed treated similar to a 2D PIN/pattern-pad.
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6.4 Gaze-based Authentication, Threat Modeling, and RubikAuth’s Characteristics
We further discuss gaze-based authentication on RubikAuth, the significance of advanced, yet
realistic, threat models when assessing a system’s resistance to observations, and RubikAuth’s
characteristics along promising future work directions.
6.4.1 A Closer Look on Gaze-based Interaction on RubikAuth. Although gaze is the most
preferred pointing method and highest ranked in the security ranking by participants, authentications
are slower and slightly more error-prone. Participants explained that the relatively lower input
accuracy of gaze and 0-switch passwords is due to the high speed of gaze pointing, which sometimes
results in pointing at the following target before confirming selection of the prior target using the
trigger. This occurs less often when switching surfaces (Figure 5).
Some users leak information by slightly moving their heads along with their eye movements. This
is how the experimenter uncovered one RubikAuth password entered by gaze. This is because gaze
and head movements are closely associated under natural conditions [9, 10] and is in line with what
Sidenmark et al. [117] suggested: eye gaze should be treated as multimodal input that combines eye,
head, and body movement.
However, Collins and Barnes experiments [20] showed that under certain circumstances gaze and
head movements can be controlled independently. Future longitudinal studies of RubikAuth should
confirm how likely it is that users move their head and body when interacting using gaze. Such head
and body movements when providing input on RubikAuth may eliminate the security benefits of
using gaze-based authentication in the long run. A further question to consider is whether users can
leverage conflicting head and eye movements to trick attackers.
Furthermore, a comprehensive review of knowledge-based authentication schemes highlighted
the need of schemes that adapt to the overall context of use [66]. Future systems can detect head
movements and either warn the user or take precautions (e.g., rotating the cube to confuse attackers)
in situations where they are at stake of being observed. Although gaze and head movements are
closely associated, they can be controlled independently [20] and can therefore enable users to trick
attackers when providing gaze-based input on RubikAuth.
6.4.2 Employing Suitable Threat Models. Existing work focused mostly on one-time shoulder
surfing attacks, and video attacks recorded using a stationary camera [39, 41, 42, 100]. We employed
three threat models that simulate best case scenario for attackers. While successful attack rates did
not differ significantly across the threat models, the accuracy of guesses increased significantly. This
allowed us to gain a better understanding of the impact of switches and pointing methods (Findings
11 and 12). We argue that evaluations of authentication schemes should employ advanced threat
models like the ones considered in this paper to ensure realistic results. This is particularly important
for VR where the user is often unaware of their surroundings [40, 88], which in turn allows observers
to inconspicuously optimise their attacks by, for example, recording videos or using support material.
6.4.3 Users’ Perception vs Reality. Previous work found that users’ perceptions of what makes
passwords secure do not always match reality [51, 130]. In our evaluation, we found that users have
a basic understanding of what makes a RubikAuth password more secure against observations. This
is in line with what Katsini et al. [68] found when exploring different image grid visualisations and
the creation of strong graphical passwords on a desktop computer. For example, when asked to set
strong passwords, participants selected passwords with multiple surface switches, and reported they
prefer using eye gaze and believe it is the most secure (Finding 8 and 14).
We found that increasing the number of cube manipulations significantly improves observation
resistance, and that using gaze for pointing results in the least accurate guesses by attackers. Further,
our participants used their knowledge from other authentication schemes to inform their decisions
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related to password strength. For example, some participants used “1234” as the weak password [7].
This raises further interesting questions for future work: to what extent do users transfer their knowl-
edge of other schemes? and how does this impact the security and usability of novel authentication
mechanisms? Future work can gain insights into habituation when using an authentication scheme
like RubikAuth over a longer period of time. Prior work indeed showed that habituation can affect
the way users authenticate and interact with a system [101, 126]. Furthermore, prior work by Katsini
et al. [67, 69] found that the user’s likelihood to create weak graphical passwords can be predicted
from their gaze behaviour. Future work can explore if gaze behaviour can predict the creation of
weak RubikAuth passwords and nudge the user accordingly.
6.4.4 Manipulate the Cube to Manipulate the Attacker? Some participants mentioned that Ru-
bikAuth allows them to apply fake cube rotations to trick attackers. Qualitative feedback from the
security study revealed that some poses allow selection from multiple surfaces without explicitly
rotating the cube. This can be particularly effective against observations when combined with gaze
pointing, and could potentially counteract the increased authentication time caused by rotating the
cube. While these findings indicate that users can go an extra mile for additional security, it is not
clear if users would indeed do that. Previous work showed that sometimes users know what would
constitute secure behaviour, but refrain from doing it due to usability issues [130]. An interesting
next step would be to investigate the extent to which users of RubikAuth adapt their behaviour
to improve security even more. While we encourage future work in studying cases where users
introduce randomness to their input (e.g., fake rotations, personalised visual design), we strongly
advise against having the system introduce randomness by, for example, randomising the layout
of digits. Previous work has shown repeatedly that randomising authentication interface elements
reduces usability significantly [1, 25, 133].
During our experiments, a few participants already mentioned that fake rotations could be applied
to trick potential attackers and that a more frequent usage would result in even faster entry times and
establish some kind of muscle memory. We believe that practice also benefits attackers. In particular,
we expect that attackers will come up with more advanced observation attacks over time.
Another way to complicate attacks is by dynamically switching pointing methods during authen-
tication as suggested by one participant. However, it is necessary to investigate to what extent a
seamless transition between multiple pointing methods can be provided and how it affects usability.
6.4.5 RubikAuth: A Personalised Authentication Scheme? Although users are in full control of
RubikAuth’s position and orientation in the virtual environment, some may also prefer a smaller-sized
cube or alternative arrangements of RubikAuth’s password elements. Prior work suggests that the
representation of authentication schemes (e.g., the size) can have a noticeable impact on usability and
security [42]. In RubikAuth, users could “personalise” the authentication scheme to meet individual
requirements. For example, users could come up with different cube sizes. Note that we strictly
distinguish between personalised and randomised: with personalised we refer to a RubikAuth that is
designed individually by the user and does not introduce a random factor.
Our qualitative analysis regarding users’ most frequent recall strategies in Section 4.4 revealed
that users rely on spatial proximities, visual patterns, and physical movements and rotations when
recalling a RubikAuth password. This suggests that introducing any kind of randomisation would
break their strategy or force users coming up with alternative approaches. The most frequent voiced
recall strategies suggest that users remembered the spatial arrangement of their individual passwords
rather than the digits and surface colours. This is in line with guidelines for designing graphical
authentication mechanism interfaces [108]: people are particularly good at remembering spatial
source positions [43], which is also supported by the pictorial superiority effect [96] and dual
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encoding [18]. This also emphasises the strengths of a secure and easy-to-use authentication system
as presented with RubikAuth.
Compared to graphical authentication schemes that use personalised pictures, e.g., faces from
family members or friends [13, 32], a personalised setting of RubikAuth (in terms of cube size and/or
arrangement of the numbers) would not necessarily decrease security. For example, one could think
of an individual arrangement of RubikAuth’s password elements (e.g., swapping the position of the
“1” with the “9”) , a 90° rotation of specific RubikAuth surfaces or of the entire cube at the beginning
of an authentication. If users are in full control of such authentication scheme characteristics, they
are still able to apply above-mentioned recall strategies or even enhance them if the system allows it.
6.5 Concluding Remarks: RubikAuth and the Recent Trend of Continuous
Authentication in Virtual Reality
Unlike continuous authentication schemes, RubikAuth is an entry point scheme that does not require
continuous sensor data (e.g., human body movements). RubikAuth is still capable of securing
entire VR interaction sessions, and even improving continuous authentication schemes that rely on
behavioural biometrics.
6.5.1 Securing the Entire VR Interaction Session. Ensuring that an intruder cannot take over a VR
system after the user has authenticated can be achieved in two ways: 1) via continuous authentication,
or 2) by requiring the user to authenticate again whenever they take off their VR HMD.
Continuous authentication can be achieved using behavioural biometrics. Although there are
several recent works that propose this in VR (e.g., [78, 86, 90, 91, 103]), Miller et al.’s work is the
first that explores cross-system behavioural biometric authentication in VR [91], which is essential
in a world where users may have multiple VR systems in the foreseeable future. Indeed, 21.7% of
millennial respondents to a questionnaire claim to already own such a VR device [30] and, similar to
the increased adoption of other technologies such as smartphones [16], it is expected that households
will have multiple VR devices in the near future. The recent increasing interest in consumer VR
devices (e.g., Oculus Quest’s sell-through shipments [31]) and the wide-spread adoption of VR
devices underscore the need for authentication schemes that are generalisable across different devices.
To build generalisable VR authentication schemes, contextual factors such as the hardware of the
different VR HMDs should be considered [66]. The work by Miller et al. [91] is an example of
generalising an authentication scheme across different VR HMDs with different hardware specs.
Interacting with RubikAuth involves lots of movements and rotations: head, gaze, non-dominant
hand, and dominant hand movements that could be used to establish an additional behaviour-based
security layer on top of a knowledge-based authentication scheme. While we consider such an
approach still to be an entry point authentication, it would not require long-term or permanent access
to sensor data [110], but still has the potential to make authentications more secure [86]. Given
that VR sessions are considered to be rather long (M=38 minutes [29]) compared to, for example,
smartphone sessions (M=5.12 minutes (307 seconds)) [57], sensors (e.g., the proximity sensor in
the Oculus Quest [111]) could be used to log off users when they step out of the VR experience
(i.e., when taking off the HMD) to prevent malicious users from accessing sensitive data after
authentications. However, we have to keep in mind that such an approach would require users to
explicitly re-authenticate; thus, users may not make use of such a feature [130].
6.5.2 RubikAuth as a Fallback for Biometric Authentication. There are situations where biometric
systems are not functional enough anymore; thus, alternative fallback authentication mechanisms are
required. For example, when VR devices are used in situations with restricted freedom of movements
(e.g., using VR during air travel [132]) human-behavioural movements may not be feasible anymore
for continuous authentication. In such scenarios it is vital to provide equally usable and secure
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fallback authentication mechanisms. Biometric authentication oftentimes relies on knowledge-based
authentication as a fallback method [8] and it is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future [56]. An
authentication scheme is only as strong as its weakest link, and if fallback authentication methods
are insecure, then even the most secure biometric authentication scheme is insecure [127]. Although
RubikAuth is not primarily designed as a fallback authentication method, it is also capable of acting
as a fast and highly secure fallback method, especially in situations where behavioural biometric
authentication is ineffective and not possible given the context a user is in.
6.6 Learned Lessons for Designing Authentication for Virtual Reality
To summarise, we draw the following lessons learned for designing and evaluating novel authentica-
tion schemes in VR:
(1) The use of manipulable 3D objects in VR greatly improves authentication speed and
observation resistance.
(2) Increasing the number of manipulations (e.g., surface switches in RubikAuth) improves
security further and presents opportunities to trick observers, but could negatively influence
usability (e.g., increases input time).
(3) Using gaze improves security but requires longer authentication time and might be insecure
if users inadvertently move their heads.
(4) Leveraging additional characteristics of novel authentication schemes, e.g., physical
movements when authenticating, is a promising direction to support memorability and
enable users to consolidate a specific motor task into memory through repetition.
(5) Studying threat models beyond classical one-time observations by, for example, including
real-world 3D replicas and smartphones with HD cameras to record and playback the
authentications, improves our understanding of the security of VR authentication systems.
7 CONCLUSION
We investigated authentication in virtual reality (VR) using an environment-independent manipulable
3D cube. We compared pointing at targets on the cube using eye gaze, head pose, and controller
tapping. We conducted three within-subjects experiments, a usability study (N=23), a follow-up
memorability study (N=21), and a security study (N=15). Across three studies, we showed how an
environment-independent manipulable 3D authentication scheme improves authentications in VR
in terms of usability and observation resistance. First, in our usability study we found that entering
a four-symbol password on RubikAuth using controller tapping is significantly faster (2.60 s) than
head pose (3.44 s) and eye gaze (3.60 s). In terms of usability and security our participants preferred
gaze-based interaction for authentications on RubikAuth. Second, our memorability study revealed
that users tried to memorise their RubikAuth passwords with the help of spatial positions of the digits
and by recalling physical movements and rotations. Third, our security study highlighted the high
resistance of RubikAuth to observation attacks, even under classical and enhanced threat models.
Gaze-based interaction on RubikAuth outperformed head pose and controller tapping in terms of
resistance to observation attacks. Observation resistance is 96% for controller tapping, 97.79% for
head pose, and 99.55% for eye gaze. Finally, our results suggest that providing attackers with support
material contributes to more critical security evaluations. We concluded with five lessons learned for
the design and evaluation of authentication schemes for virtual reality.
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